THE

MODERN CHURCHMAN

By identifying the new learning with heresy, you make orthodoxy synonymous with ignorance.—*Erasmus.*

A State without the means of change is without the means of its conservation.—*Edmund Burke.*

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IN MEMORIAM

CANON GAMBLE.

THE death of Canon Gamble is a loss to what may be called the element of thought in the Church of England. This element is neither large, prominent, nor much encouraged among us. But 'salt is good'; and, as an eighteenth century bishop quaintly puts it, 'the Church, like the Ark of Noah, is worth saving: not for the sake of the unclean beasts and vermin that almost filled it, and probably made most noise and clamour in it; but for the little corner of rationality, that was as much distressed by the stench within it as by the tempest without.' He was what was formerly called a Broad Churchman — I do not know why the term has fallen out of use: but his temper was not controversial; it did not come naturally to him to strive or cry; nor did he care to make his voice heard in the street.

He was rather a philosopher than a historian, and was interested rather in the fundamentals of religion than in their superstructure. His last published work, 'Three Lectures delivered last year in the University of Bristol, on the Traditional Idea of God' (Arrowsmith, Bristol, 1929; 1/-), breathed a higher air than that of the pulpit or the platform. He was a member of the Modern Churchmen's Union; but he was seldom seen at its Conferences, now an annual event in the religious world: he was not what is called in Scotland an 'Assembly man'; and, like St. Gregory Nazianzen, he avoided Synods, which this

Father unkindly described as 'Councils of Geese and Cranes.' This was why he did not take the position in the Church to which his abilities entitled him. His friends regretted this: but perhaps he judged wisely. Neither his health, nor his temperament, fitted him for elbowing the crowd; and *optimam partem elegit Maria.* He had no love for the limelight. He was for thirty years Vicar of Leigh Woods, a residential suburb of Bristol. Here his sermons were addressed to those 'persons of education,' as Jowett used to call them, for whom the Church of England has at present little interest or attraction, and who seem to be falling more and more out of touch with official Anglicanism. It would be difficult to find a pulpit which struck so high a note. For the last seven years of his life he had been a Canon of Bristol; and had from the first taken an active interest in education both in the University and in the city. An old friend, the Dean of Rochester, writes that 'it was not possible to say to what "school" he belonged.' For religion as an institution he had a reverent regard; but he feared the danger in which it stood from some of its friends or assailants. He never entered into Church politics, but gave himself to think out and express what he believed the Christian faith meant, and to provide a home within the institution for the religious intellect. 'In quietness and in confidence shall be your strength.' Those who, with the author of the Christian year, take these words as their motto are not the Church's worst friends.

A.F.

SIGNS OF THE TIMES

The Roman Question.

The *Concordat* between Mussolini and the Pope has caused alarm and surprise to devout liberals, whether political or theological, all over the civilized world. The alarm is doubtless well-founded, but the surprise is only shared by those who dwell in a pre-war world. We live in times when liberalism has slumped heavily, since liberalism cannot breathe in an atmosphere of fear. At present every European nation fears either its neighbours, or large sections of its own population—the militarist beyond the frontier, or the communist at home. Under these conditions, liberalism seems either treachery or lunacy: the only sane policy seems to be one of military expansion and political repression.

Mussolini knows perfectly well what he is about, and has evidently got the best of the bargain. For a few acres of territory and a pecuniary compensation, he has freed himself from a domestic embarrassment, and invested his *régime* with an aureole of respectability which is moral and religious as well as merely social and political. Moreover, he sees that the ecclesiastics are the best enemies of the communists, whose mentality they understand—since it is similar to their own. Mussolini has successfully yoked the Black International to fight the Red. He now need only sit and look on; his anxieties are halved. To account for this stroke of policy, there is no need to introduce the hypothesis, as some have done, of the special activity of an over-ruling Providence; mutual interest, or what has seemed to be such, is an adequate explanation. Like gravitates unto like; and friends must stand together.

It was observed above that Mussolini had the best of the bargain; and he has probably lengthened the life of his *régime* by ten, twenty, or even (at a pinch) thirty years. Beyond that, no one in these days would extend his range of prophecy. As for the Church, such a manifest alliance with the forces of political and social sobriety and security will, of course, do much to establish its position: prudent men will hesitate to demolish

or discredit an institution which stands for property, stability, morals, and a disciplined proletariat. Even those who doubt its doctrines will support it. For what are doctrines? They may be serviceable, even if they are not true. Though false to the philosopher, to the Facist they are useful.

But for the Pope himself? If he be a prudent man (and does not ecclesiastical office develop prudence?) he will not be too ready to take advantage of his new-found mobility. Yet pressure is bound to be put upon him to go on tour: since his entourage of cardinals would not be impervious to the seductions of publicity. Yet publicity is always dangerous, and is avoided by the wise. A pope immured is first a martyr and then a god; but a pope with a portfolio, a sort of official minister of religion to a *facist* cabinet, will cease to be a portent and become a man.

To travel in Europe might not do much harm. In France, in Germany, in England—perhaps even in Ireland also—the Pope would be treated with respect. Bare-headed crowds would stand outside Victoria station, and the police would manage things with admirable tact. But in America? And to America the Pope would be bound to go. Many people do not shrink from believing that New York will one day replace Rome as the home of the Papacy. Nor is this an extravagant belief. Yet a visit to America, though inevitable, is fraught with a serious danger. It is not that some Irish-American will assassinate the Pope. He will be perfectly safe from violence: but will he be safe from popularity? The great American public has the inimitable faculty of idolizing everyone with a Whitmanesque impartiality. And where everyone is an idol, no one is an idol—or not in the true sense. In those States, the Pope will only be one of many other notabilities: his rivals will be cinema stars, financiers, airmen, successful politicians, pugilists, criminals. In a democratic community, the great must hide themselves if they wish to retain greatness: otherwise they are ranged in the popular gallery of heroes, and they will feel uncomfortable at the contact.

The Pope, if he becomes an idol, will cease to be divine: and if he remains divine, he will not for long (in a democratic community) remain an idol. So that either way he will lose his

prestige if he visits America. Remoteness is his safeguard: the Prisoner of the Vatican should not seek liberation.

Thus, while yielding to none in our appreciation of the adroitness of the Curia, and the sagacity of Mussolini, we are inclined to wonder whether the ultimate fruits of this holy compact will be what its promoters expect.

Perils in the Way.

The Dean of St. Paul's, in an admirable article in the *Manchester Evening News*, has expressed the view that a drastic Reunion policy would split the Church from top to bottom. The *Church Times* certainly confronts all proposals of reunion with Protestant bodies with implacable hostility; and we may be sure that the legend of an Apostolical Succession has an incredible value for those who hold it. Certainly no one wishes to split the Church, nor would we drive any man to the sacrifice of his prejudices. For our own part we should be satisfied with something considerably less than reunion—with permission, for example, to treat Nonconformists as fellow-Christians. Interchange of pulpits, inter-communion, and a certain mutual consideration and tolerance would do much to create a new atmosphere. While not denying the pious myths and fabrications upon which exclusive sacerdotal claims rest (which are the great barrier to reunion), we might ignore them. After all, historical truths, when they run counter to received fictions, are not commonly popular. They need not be preached in season and out of season. The Apostolic Succession need not be denied. There was no need, it has been said, for Apollo and Zeus to be refuted; they expired. Theories last for a season, and then evaporate. Even now, this myth is credited only by the clergy, and even they, if they did not regard loyalty to it as a piece of professional *etiquette*, would quickly abandon it. We desire to destroy no man's beliefs; nor yet to give them a longer lease of life by attacking them. We appeal to Modernists not to attach undue importance to the survival of unhistorical fictions.

Yet bishops would do well not to be too timid in 1930. Not all threats are made with the purpose of fulfilment. Even ecclesiastical persons have been known to bluff. If our Catholic friends resolve to split, how many of the clergy will follow?

This new emigration of St. Bartholomew will not be too popular. Rome, indeed, might welcome these *emigrés*, but life in the bosom of Rome would prove uncongenial to many. Rome has a different system of ecclesiastical discipline from ours. Will the Catholic, whose privilege it has been continually to flout episcopal authority, be happy in a Church where bishops are respected and feared? Moreover, many of our malcontents are married, and what will *they* do? We doubt if extreme Anglicans have any genuine desire to secede. If they had, they would have done so long ago. They prefer to remain where they are; and they are right. We prefer to keep them: but we have no desire to see them dictating the policy of the Lambeth Conference. Our advice to the bishops is courage, courage, and again courage. There are times when this quality is a virtue; and the present is one of them.

Fundamentalism and Reunion.

In our view, the most serious objection to reunion is that, for the sake of unity, we might reunite on a Fundamentalist basis. This danger should not be ignored. Yet it is less serious perhaps than might be supposed when one regards the rank and file of the Nonconformist bodies, or the rank and file of the English Church. The poor we have always with us; pious ignorance flourishes in every religious institution, and if all the devout fanatics could unite, where would be a place for a rational being in a world submerged by a flood of dogmatic frenzy? Yet, even in a democratic age, it is not the rank and file who count. English Nonconformity numbers many competent and enlightened scholars, who would hesitate to surrender their birthright of knowledge and freedom. These men would not betray their communities to the ecclesiastical bagmen who want to reunite the Churches along the lines of a business amalgamation. Nonconformity has liberal leaders, and we can trust these men and our own bishops (far more liberal, for the most part, than the rank and file of the clergy) not to do anything that would render us all ridiculous.

THE CREATIVE ELEMENTS OF TYRRELL'S RELIGIOUS THOUGHT

By Miss M. D. Petre.

IN the following lecture* I propose to deal with the creative rather than the *militant* qualities of Tyrrell's contribution to religious thought. For although there have, indeed, been men whose fame is the fame of those who destroy and not of those who construct, yet the truly immortal element of a man's work is to be found in what he has built up and not in what he has thrown down.

Some time ago, after passing through a period of grave trouble and anxiety, I gave up a few days to solitary religious retreat, and I then found myself forced to face what we all dread to face, the unfilled *lacunae* in our modern religious life.

Can those of us who are to any, the least extent, affected by modern thought in religious questions deny the existence of those *lacunae*, of which we are most conscious when we get on our knees and begin to pray? Like St. Thomas when he was a little boy, but with a sense of tragedy which he did not experience, we ask ourselves, because we have no one else to ask, who is God? What is God? With a sense of tragedy that he did not experience, because his young mind was filled with a purely metaphysical curiosity, he wanted to know what God was like; to learn what the mind of man had conceived as to the ultimate mystery of being, the nature and characteristics of his Maker. He had the curiosity of the young philosopher, and was not to be tranquillized by the pious answer that God was his Father; but if he sought a deeper and fuller notion of God, it was not because that notion was, for him, in any sense unreal. The Divine Personality was the most tremendous fact in his world of thought, and all he asked was to be allowed to exercise every faculty of his mind on that great ultimate fact.

We, in our day, who find ourselves in live contact with what history and science tell us in regard to subjects once guarded from profane investigation, ask that same question in more

* Delivered to the Worthing Branch of the Modern Churchmen's Union.

tragic tone—Who is God? What is God? And again, Who is Christ? What is Christ? It is not always metaphysical curiosity that inspires our question; it is religious hunger. We have to pray: we want to know to whom we are praying. We have to live: we want to know under whom or under what, for what end or to what end, we are living. We want to love—deeply, widely, eternally to love: who and what is the supreme object of love?

Now I am confident that I am not speaking merely of my own experience in such matters when I say all this; it is surely a common, if not a general, experience amongst those who not only think, but also believe; who care for truth as the food of the mind, but care for it also as the food of the heart and the soul.

I will go further and venture on a bold statement; quite willing to be contradicted by those who disagree with me. I will say that truth, as we human beings are condemned to learn it, that is to say, *piecemeal*, brings with it, in many of its phases, loss as well as gain. It has often the bite of the North wind; the devastating, demoralizing, devitalizing influence of the East wind.

I once took a fancy to translate a frivolous poem by Nietzsche, addressed 'To the South.' In it he extols the lightness and frivolity, but also the brightness and vitality, of Southern life. In the North he says:

I shudder to say
I worshipped a woman, hideous and gray—
Her name was Truth, so I heard them say,—
But I left her there and I flew away
To the South.

Have we, also, not sometimes wished that we could fly away from that grim face of Truth? That we could loosen the clutch of her hand on some of our most treasured goods? Do we not sometimes wonder with Omar Khayyam,

'What the Vintners buy
One half so precious as the Goods they sell?'

that is to say, what scientific truth and thought bring us in place of some of the beliefs of which they dispossess us?

This sense of desolation results, to my mind, as I have just

intimated, from our piecemeal acquisition of truth; but I do want to stress the fact of this sense of spiritual loss, for I think we are apt to shrink from the honest recognition thereof.

More than this, I want, if I can, to carry you with me to the further recognition that the best work of the pioneer, or at least the work for which he is entitled to our lasting gratitude, is not his work of clearing, but his work of constructing; did he only knock down he might, indeed, help those who come after him to build, but he might not even do that. To pull down a house is not in any sense to build one, even though it clear the space for doing so. That space might be left empty; might become the breeding ground of noxious weeds, a dump for every kind of filth, a home for rats and other vermin.

To kill a lie, to quench an illusion, may be the necessary preliminary to the establishment of truth, but the second is the greater achievement of the two. Also it may be said that the work of mind and spirit is not like purely manual and mechanical work. We can never simply throw down in the life of thought; old ideas are expelled by new ones; old truths by new ones. He who only demolishes may leave, in the spiritual order, such a dump as we have described—a breeding-place for rank and poisonous vegetation, or just a space on which others will construct. This is why I am keen to set forward, in this place, the constructive rather than the militant elements and characteristics of Fr. Tyrrell's work. We all know that he stood up and faced the thunders of condemnation; that he spoke truth to those in power; that he sprang from the trenches and rushed on to the bayonets, earning thereby a fate which others, not any more orthodox according to official estimation, contrived to escape. He was bold, even to excess; one might even wish he had exercised, on some occasions, more prudence and restraint. All this it was that rendered him a martyr of the cause he had espoused; and he did, thereby, win for others a liberty which they enjoy without realizing that they have him to thank for it.

But as life moves on the interest of past battles consists more in the abiding changes they have wrought than in the heroism they called forth. If Tyrrell was a grand fighter — and he assuredly was — we still want to know what he earned for us by his fight; what he built in the place of what he threw down.

Hence, I would like to set forth — very sketchily indeed, for I must avoid excessive length — a few of what I regard as the main characteristics of his religious teaching.

First let us take that principle which inspired so many of his writings, the *Lex orandi, lex credendi* — the maxim that the law of prayer was the law of belief.

> *'Prayer,'* he writes, *'is to be taken widely for the life of charity, of Divine love, of will—union with God and His saints; "Belief" is to be taken for those conceptions of the nature and laws of the other world which are presupposed by Charity, which determine and characterize that Divine Love and give it its special tone and colour. In other words, a perfect penetration of the nature of Divine Charity and of the Christian spirit would show us that this spirit of charity was begotten and fed by those truths which find their expression in the Creed.'*
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> (Lex Orandi, pp. 59-60.)

These words are not an utterance of mere pragmatism; they go deeper than that. They express the belief that religious doctrines possess their spiritual value, not in virtue of any merely theoretical accuracy or value, but in virtue of their presentation of that truth which is a manifestation of life, and, in the case of religion, of divine life. If pragmatism, it is pragmatism of a transcendental order; it is a reaching out to that ultimate reality where truth is proved by its concordance with life because truth and life are one and knowledge and love are ineffably blended. Thus he says in another place:

> *'It is not enough for the apologist to connect the truth of theology with the truths of history and science; he must go on to connect the life of religion with the rest of our life, and to show that the latter demands the former. This is to some extent the aim of that "affective" apologetic which appeals to the will and affection by enlarging on the beauties and utilities of religion. . . . But this appeal is but a seduction . . . unless it can be further shown that, under certain conditions, utility is dependent upon truth, that if beliefs react fruitfully upon life it is because they have first been shaped by life . . . that no belief can be universally useful unless also it be true.'*

Further on he says:

> *'The Creed is wrapt up in the Lord's Prayer, which embodies the aims and aspirations of the human soul of Christ, and gives voice to His love. If the "Our Father" is the criterion of all Christian prayer, by which every spirit is to be tried, it is indirectly the criterion of every belief, because prayer and belief are so inextricably intertwined.'*
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> (*Ibid.*, 60-61.)

The volume *Lex Credendi* is an elaborated development of this view of the Lord's Prayer.

His impatience of the merely rationalistic forms of scholastic theology is a natural concomitant of this belief in prayer as the supreme test of religious doctrine. He said, of one of his earliest articles, that it had been, though he knew it not at the time, the keynote of all his work. That article was first entitled 'The Relation of Theology to Devotion,' and was reprinted in *Through Scylla and Charybdis* under the title 'Lex Orandi, Lex Credendi.' He treats there, in some passages too long to quote in full, of the devastating effect often wrought on the devout mind by an abstract and rationalistic discussion of the doctrines of the Incarnation and the Eucharist. Thus:

> *'When the theologian has finished his treatise "De Scientia Christi"; when he has impressed upon us that Christ was exempt from the two internal sources of all our temptations, viz. the darkness of our mind and the rebellion of our body; that in His case temptations from without met with no more response from within than when we offer food to a corpse; we cannot help feeling that under whatever abstraction this may be true, yet it cannot be the whole truth, unless all who have turned to Christ in their temptations and sorrows have been wofully deluded—unless the "lex orandi" and the "lex credendi" are strangely at strife.'*

He goes on to describe a similar result on the devout mind and heart which results from a subtle exposition of the Eucharistic doctrine, and declares:

> *'I have more than once known all the joy and reality taken out of a life, that fed on devotion to the Sacramental Presence, by such a flash of theological illumination; and have seen Magdalenes left weeping at empty tombs and crying, "They have taken away my Lord and I know not where they have laid him."'*

Yet he does not refuse theology all part in the spiritual life of the soul, for he adds later that

> *'A deeper and more comprehensive theology seems, in most cases, to bring us back to our original point of departure, albeit on a higher plane; to restore to us the stimulus of our childlike conceptions, not only fully but superabundantly. . . .* (For)
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> *'Devotion and religion existed before theology . . . and theology, as far as it formulates and justifies the devotion of the best Catholics, and as far as it is true to the life of faith and charity as actually lived, so far is it a law and corrective for all. But when it begins to contradict the facts of that spiritual life it loses its reality and authority . . . and needs itself to be corrected by the "lex orandi."'*
>
> ('Through Scylla and Charybdis.')

And yet this appeal to the bar of simple religious instinct, this passionate plea for the rights of the plain, untutored soul in its relations with its Maker and Saviour, implies no tendency to make of man's mind the measure of his God; to rend the veil of mystery and shape him according to our passing exigencies. Tyrrell believed that as there is in man an aesthetic, a scientific, a moral sense, so also there is a religious sense, not reducible to any of these. And it is that sense we must use. God is not just the philosophical term of man's theory of the universe; He is not simply the ultimate basis of man's code of morals; He is not the final principle of man's conception of art and beauty: He is something beyond all human schemes and human understanding, as remote as He is intimate, as incomprehensible as He is desirable, as necessary as He is supreme.

> *'As an affection our love of the Absolute is more than generically distinct from all our other loves; for it is not "one of them," it is not alongside, but over and through and behind them all. . . . On its negative side it might be described as a sense of incurable dissatisfaction with anything that is less than infinite and eternal . . . a sense that is deepened and enriched just in the measure that we push out experimentally in all directions, vainly seeking the Absolute on the plane of the relative. . . .*
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> *'If on its negative side this love is a revolt against the finitude of the finite, the transiency of the transient . . . it is on its positive side a felt attraction towards that which, like some dark star, is the source of all our perturbation, restlessness and discontent.'*

He even distinguishes the thirst for the divine from the thirst for God:

> *'a man may give himself to God's work, God's will, God's cause, and yet not give himself to God.'*
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> . . . . . .
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> *'Not till (the) lessons of experience are well learnt does God run forward to meet the returning soul, and by His kiss and embrace suddenly waken and call forth that wholly other kind of life and strength hitherto latent and buried—the life of personal communion with Himself, the strength of self-conquering love.'*
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> . . . . . .
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> *'The "religious sense" is therefore something distinct from the moral, the scientific, the aesthetic sense, and even from the combination of all three in what we might call the "sense of the Ideal," or of the Divine. It is the sense of God, of the absolute and infinite.'*

We see, then, that Tyrrell had no great sympathy with the employment of temporary expedients and adaptations to meet the inroads of science and philosophy into traditional religious

belief; it was in the religious sense itself that he found the surest indication of a world to which that sense responded, of a Being who made Himself conscious to us through that sense and through its very dissatisfaction.

We may ask next what place the Church held in Tyrrell's philosophy of religion. This is, of course, the subject on which his militancy is most conspicuous. He was mentally and fundamentally intolerant of worldliness — and he knew that the Church was not free from that stain. He hated anything in the nature of tyranny; and he found in the Church traditions of intellectual and moral tyranny which reached a classic development in the history of modernism. His most eloquent and outspoken denunciation of these characteristics is found in the great letter he addressed to Cardinal Mercier—the volume entitled *Medievalism.*

> *'Your Eminence,'* he exclaims in his conclusion, *'will you never take heart of grace and boldly throw open the doors and windows of your great medieval cathedral, and let the light of a new day strike into its darkest corners and the fresh wind of Heaven blow through its mouldy cloisters? In spite of the clamorous contradiction of my reason and common sense I cannot even yet bring myself to believe that it is too late. . . . Is this what Catholicism has come to—so grand a name for so mean a thing?'*

And yet, for all that, something remains to which his mind yet adheres and his heart yet clings.

> *'My faith in the Church is,'* he adds, *'in its very different way as blind as your own. . . . The very word "Catholic" is music to my ears, and summons before my eyes the outstretched, all-embracing arms of Him who died for the whole* orbis terrarum. *If the Roman Church still holds me it is . . . because, as a fact, she stands for the oldest and widest body of corporate Christian experience; for the closest approximation so far attained to the still far-distant ideal of a Catholic religion.'*

He realized, and none better, the utter loneliness of a soul deprived of spiritual society and associates.

> *'No man cometh to the Father but by me,'* he writes in *Lex Orandi,* and this: *'is true in its measure of the mystical and corporate Christ no less than of the personal Christ; for it is in that Christ, in that sanctified humanity clustered round the Cross of Calvary, that His Goodness is incarnate and revealed to us. Union with God means necessarily and identically union with the whole body of His Saints.'*
>
> *'Every spiritual movement or enthusiasm, that unites the hearts of multitudes and fires their love, tends spontaneously and by the law of*

its nature to fashion some kind of social organism or institution for the furtherance of its own development, and from the first the cause of God's Kingship over souls has ever been furthered by the instrumentality of a visible Church, union with which . . . is enjoined as a means . . . of voluntary union . . . with the Invisible Church.'

(Lex Orandi).

I think that even in the midst of the most cruel of his religious experiences he had ever an intense consciousness of this communion of souls past and present, which constituted for him the true meaning of the Church. He could bear with human defects because he had so deep a sense of reality.

I believe some have wondered why he never sought a home elsewhere; why he did not return to the Church he had left. May I answer by a little story — a true one — I once heard. About fifty years ago, when there were simple folk who knew nothing even of railway travelling, there was a little lay sister in a Brighton convent who had only been in a train once or twice in her life. She was going up to London with her Superior, and before starting begged 'dear Mother' to travel first class, 'to avoid those dreadful tunnels.'

I think, to Tyrrell, the idea of changing his Church would have been something like changing his class on the railway—the tunnels had to be faced in any class — the darkness and difficulties had to be faced in any Church — he remained in the one he had deliberately chosen.

Another all-prevailing quality of Tyrrell's teaching was his doctrine of selflessness. As I think you will have noted throughout this exposition, I regard the sum of his religious teaching as distinctly transcendental in character; the greatest for him was ever what lay beyond. So with regard to self. Its highest destiny was abandonment to the ends and purposes of a greater life, which it could, alone, neither compass nor conceive.

And I think no one more fulfilled his own ideal than did Tyrrell on this point. It would have been better, even for his religious influence, had his own self and interests not been so entirely overlooked during his short and tragic earthly career.

Sympathy with suffering, pity for pain, an union of love in which all that lived was to be comprised, while God, the supreme source of this pity and love, was the end to which all life converged — this was his conception of the Christian life of service

and charity. And as animals also had their share in his scheme of universal love, I will end with a passage from the last chapter of *Oil and Wine*, entitled 'Our Dumb Friends':

> *'Our most superficial consciousness,'* he says, *'is of isolated selfishness; then of this self as merged in the isolated family, then of the merging of the family, tribe, nation, into the unity of human brotherhood; finally we take the sentient creation, the whole world of life—nay, inanimate nature herself—into the circle of our widening affection, and recognize the Arms of our Father in Heaven clasped round the whole body and bulk of His creation—the child of His love. "Your Heavenly Father hath care of them," and in the measure that we have care for them our mind and affections are more attuned to His: "He prayeth best who loveth best all things both great and small."'*

In conclusion, let us remember that Tyrrell was cut off, not at the end, but in the middle of his career, and that we cannot know what might have been his further evolution had he lived twenty years more. But I do think we may take it that, in spite of moods of bitterness and discouragement, he would, to the end, have thought it all *worth while;* that he would not have weakened in his allegiance to the cause he had espoused; that he would have believed to the end that the only things that mattered at all were the things that mattered eternally; that God was not only our supreme End, but was also knowable, in a measure, and lovable without measure; that the life of Christ was the true model of the highest human life; and that the Christian Church, invisible and visible, divine and human, holy and imperfect, was, in spite of any suffering she might cause us, our true spiritual home upon earth.

RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS

By the Rev. NEVILLE GORTON, M.A., Sedbergh School.

II.

THE average intelligence of a school chapel is very much above that of any ordinary parish church. Except a college chapel possibly the most critical, yet they are probably more easily interested than any other congregation. The lower school will respond to the good hot-air type of sermon proportionately as the upper school will violently resent it. But any new idea presented to them, or an old idea presented freshly, will provide immediate and acute interest, to such an extent that you will find quite a number of form-masters allow themselves to be diverted on Monday morning into heated general discussions on last night's sermon.

I believe that the average boy is more interested in, if I do not say religion, in religious ideas than in any other ideas. It is the one subject that will draw immediate interest in a number together. They will read books on their own account, and think about them, though probably not discuss the subject by themselves at all. My own conviction is that, taken as a whole, and in very large numbers, they are already so near the Kingdom of God — giving a more positive form to our Lord's words to the young ruler — so many of them are already in a large measure unconsciously already of it. And yet — what happens when they leave school? Two disasters: one, they are largely lost to the Church, to that organized fellowship through which Christ can alone work effectively in the world; secondly, because of that, in their own personal lives the beginnings of the Christian life and experience never come to any proper fulfilment. Religion is rather a habit and a memory than a progressive experience and discovery developing through life. That it can rarely be unless it is continued within some institutional framework. Yet between the institutional framework of the church at the school and the church in the parish there seems a real gulf which is rarely crossed. Unless a boy goes on to the University and there, through college chapel or S.C.M., is passed

on into the wider Church; or unless he is of a certain type and is fortunate enough to live in a thoroughly well run Anglo-Catholic parish, or finds a St. Martin's at his doors, his relation to the institutional church will seldom be more than formal membership, or a partial, unconvinced and unconvincing loyalty. The parish priest may say that is the fault of the schoolmaster; the schoolmaster may retort that it is the fault of the parish priest. No schoolmaster with any sense of decency, from the comfortable quarters of a Public School, can throw stones at the parish priest of to-day. But without putting the responsibility on the individual parish priest, we have to admit the failure of institutional religion — more properly the failure of the kind of institutional religion that the church as a whole offers — to appeal to large numbers of quite decent Christian-minded people. Yet as a schoolmaster, and for the purpose of this paper, I would rather throw stones at the schoolmaster. We should all admit that there is something wrong, and really wrong, with the institutional religion we offer at school, that this hiatus and cleavage between church at school and church outside must be due to some lack of training on a wide enough institutional basis, some lack of loyalty in our outlook and teaching to a wider unity. We realise this. The main difficulty is obvious. The Public School in a sense is an artificial community. It is cut off, a little kingdom to itself. The formative years of a boy's life are spent apart from the unit of parish life and away from the associations he should be making with the parish church if they are to have their hold upon him in later years. We cannot help that. What are we to do? I take the Anglo-Catholic suggestion: what you want is (*a*) more definite Church teaching; (*b*) more dogmatic theology.

The educationalist is always faced with the problem as to whether the emphasis is to be on authority or upon encouraging individual thinking. The problem is not confined to theology, but it is more acute here in a practical issue. He must find a compromise between the 'take it or leave it' text-book type of theology and a policy of 'muddle yourself through." I believe that our first duty is not, as some would have it, to make a boy think for himself. He will do that. What he wants is subject-matter for thought presented as a part of, and within, a definite

system. That system can be found within the Catholic faith presented as a spiritual and intellectual inheritance based on the widest and most profound experience — a great cumulative tradition which, if presented as a rational intelligible unity, stands up to reason and is the expression of it. Such teaching is possible, and in attempting it our difficulty is to suit our vocabulary to the least as well as to the most intelligent. Our business should be much more with constructive dogmatic theology, rather than with 'I think this and I feel that.' We can have too much of the type of teacher who thinks it his business often artificially to stimulate and create difficulties, and then meet them by apologetics of a tentative, occasional and personal character. I am questioning the wisdom of feeding small boys on Hankey and 'The Man Nobody Knows,' however much the immediate appeal, in preference to Patterson Smyth, and very much the justification of Middleton Murry where *Essays Catholic and Critical* really meets the need. The boy wants to know what the Church believes. He wants something to get his teeth into, what the body of the Church has thought, more than what somebody or other, however individually distinguished or interesting, happens to think or feel about Christ. In this sense what the school needs, and what we all need, is more dogmatic theology.

But the English Church—its strength and weakness—provides neither the schoolmaster nor the parish priest with any agreed and authoritative dogmatic system. We have the Catechism and the Articles, indeed, but we shall get no help from the Church as an official body till it has rewritten both. The average schoolmaster who is not a trained theologian, any more than the parish priest, has no text-book to put into the hands of others or to direct his own belief or teaching.

But, first of all, let me examine the plea for what the Anglo-Catholic would call more definite Church teaching and the practical suggestions he would make to ensure it. The end would be secured, he would say, by putting into every school a really properly-trained priest in an independent position in complete charge of the religious life and teaching of the school. But, in the first place, the Public Schools are there primarily to give the public what it wants; and parents would not submit to the com-

plete control on thorough-going Anglo-Catholic lines of either the worship or teaching. But without going so far as that, let us take into the Public School as chaplain a thorough good fellow of the type who, with clear-cut dogmas on faith and Church, is doing fine work in many parishes in England; give him an independent job as chaplain, detached from school discipline, and let him do his best. He and his teaching will appeal to a certain number of boys. He will gather a small circle round him, its extent frankly dependent on the personality of the man. But if his teaching be of the type generally connected with 'definite Church teaching,' this will be at the cost of creating a cleavage within the school — a Church within the Church. He cannot with the opportunities open to him in a house system, working as he must in a somewhat artificial relation to the boys, get to know really well more than a comparatively small number. His teaching will run counter to what teaching the boy has had at home; it will also run counter to the teaching and outlook of the form-master and house-master, who are in most cases in much more direct, natural, personal and continuous contact with the boys. The average collective opinion of the school will be that, not religion, but institutional religion is some exotic thing which the school chaplain has charge of, and those who like it go in for it. The cleavage of opinion which is at the root of the average man's difficulty in relation to the Church will repeat itself at school. The chaplain's main difficulty will be with the Sixth Forms. Here you have largely the opinion of the school moulded by boys whose whole training is in the historical, critical or scientific method. Presented with the faith once delivered through the medium of this type of mind, they have either to accept it through an act of the denial of reason, or reject it, and with it the real opportunities of coming through to some form of rational truth at school. Either course is possibly equally disastrous to the clever boy who goes on to the University or has to use his brains in business and life. A certain proportion, perhaps a large proportion, of the school may be Presbyterian or Nonconformist. The view which would insist on some exclusive authority for the Anglican Church, based upon Apostolic succession, carrying with it exclusive sacerdotal claims, comes in direct conflict with their experience of the fellowship of the

school and of their contacts in parish life and parish church with what seem, at any rate to them, facts. Frankly, the average boy — he may be right or wrong, and he would certainly be very polite in suppressing or explaining such opinion before the priest — regards such a view as silly. The fate of a chaplain who bases his whole position on that is certain. He may create a circle of his own, but as regards the school corporate life he will fight a losing battle with the traditions of the place, with the boys' parents, and above all with the whole body of the staff. For whatever the measure of the chaplain's efforts or personality, it is the staff who are the determining factor in what the school as a whole thinks. The value of an independent chaplain might indeed be considerable, but his influence is supplementary, not determinant.

The fellowship of the school is the *corpus ecclesiae*, not a knot of the faithful who accept a particular form of Church teaching, or the minority who are more frequent in their communions. It is from this conviction that school religion must start — from the experience, for what it is worth, of the fellowship of the Kingdom in the school. It must seek to create in chapel forms of worship and praise which are the expression of that fellowship, and to draw out a conscious relation to that which is assumed or half realized. In the measure in which we succeed in eliciting this conscious corporate attitude in the school, and in embodying it in adequate forms of worship, we have also to try to relate it to, and to give it a setting within, the idea of that wider unity, the Church without.

We start with the problem of chapel services. They stand for the life of the Church to those within the school. Here we have got to experiment. Mattins and the pseudo-cathedral choir service simply does not work. We have to experiment in creating forms of worship which meet the needs of the individual and the group as a whole. I have omitted so far a discussion as to the place of the Communion service. First of all because a discussion of that would involve the problem of Confirmation. Secondly, I do not agree with my Anglo-Catholic friends, or a certain section of them, that the Christian life in the Church starts with and ends with the Communion service, and that apart from it there is no religion or life of the Church worth speaking

of. I am considering, too, the practical possibilities in a Public School where most boys belong to an evangelical tradition and a third of the school are not members of the Church of England. Under such conditions the Communion service must be the culminating point of devotion rather than its starting point. I could write with some venom on the subject of a youthful Anglo-Catholic priest who, on seeing services produced which we agreed really met a need, passed the comment, How pathetic! All prayer except the Mass being pathetic. Its value, unless we accept the crudest *ex opere operato* theory, and certainly the extent of its appeal — and this, I imagine, would be found the experience in ordinary parish life as well as in the school — depends upon the religious teaching and instruction, and upon the discovery of the meaning and value of corporate worship and private prayer, by means of, and within, more elementary and perhaps secondary, forms of devotion.

And it is these services which we are vitally concerned in developing, at any rate in the public school, probably in the church. We need services varying in the appeal and the demands they make. We should include the quiet habitual level of family prayers with gratitude and praise in the fairly elementary form of hymn singing. We need also to stimulate thought and meditation on the varying aspects of the Christian year and Christian doctrine, again providing subjects of intercession to widen the idea of personal Christian responsibility towards world needs. Then may be introduced an intention, and subjects for prayer relative to the ordinary concrete ethical needs of daily life, all at the same time in the corporate setting of a sense of Christian fellowship of need and endeavour.

Mattins with additional collects simply does not help, nor a single fine sixteenth century Litany. Such service books as Acts of Devotion are too mystically highbrow, and assume the feelings and atmosphere of the devout few. We need, too, the typical service and accompanying training that, amongst other things, assumes that the congregation is the choir, and a willingness on the part of all present to attempt to create in music, prayer and ritual something which is a work of art, and in itself an act of worship. And in pursuing these experiments, easier in a school than in a parish church, we have first to consider the

needs and psychology of those we ask to worship, but above all to show that any success depends upon the co-operation of the whole community. Once get something of that, and we begin to make a bridge of escape from that infernal, ingrained, religious individualism which is the root of the whole difficulty. The idea of the Church as something that not only meets their needs but asks their co-operation, leads to the idea of the Church of Christ as an actuality which may have absolute claims upon them. *Nulla salus extra ecclesiam* is in a sense true enough for the world to-day, and applies fully to the public school boy. Our real problem at the Public School, as elsewhere, is how to re-create the sense of the Church and its actuality.

How, then, to present the claims of the Church of Christ? This is the appalling difficulty in Confirmation: to overstress, or even adequately to stress, the inspiration of the Church and its sacramental claims provokes merely polite scepticism in face of their comparative boredom with a good deal of chapel services, and their experience of boredom connected with the normal parish church.

Yet, on the other hand, the ideal of the Catholic Church is a thing not so difficult to state and has an immediate appeal. The idea of the weight of spiritual and intellectual authority belonging to the great historical society, with its experience and traditions, is one which presents itself as reasonable. 'We want to know what to believe'; and the belief of the Church can be presented with more authority and provokes more assent than the individual's speculations.

We read history in schools much more widely now, and boys are familiar with something of the quality of that Catholic and Christian tradition. It is an interesting, and perhaps to some modern churchmen a disturbing fact, but the appeal of the ideal, if not the reality, of the mediaeval Church is a real appeal. Protestantism has still its power to move the emotions, and is embedded in the habit of traditional ideas, but as an idea or an ideal it makes no permanent appeal of any kind to the intelligent and thinking boy.

You will find, for instance, that boys reading history will sympathize with Charles V rather than with Luther; with Mary Queen of Scots rather than with Knox and the Covenanter; with

Laud and Charles I rather than with Calvin, Milton or Cromwell. Gairdner, Feiling and even Belloc alter for them the balance of English history, and enlist their sympathies, as against Froude, Trevelyan and the Protestant mythologists. We can assume a sympathy there with the Catholic ideal once apparent to them, and historically it is easy to present the English Church as in a real sense heir to that tradition, basing its authority upon it, and including traditions of value of its own. The public school boy is above all an Englishman too; he may sympathize with Rome in the sixteenth century, but it is not for him a practical possibility to-day.

It is in this setting and with this background of authority that we can develop the dogmatic side of our teaching as to the Christian faith. The Christian faith is that tradition we have to translate into terms of to-day. Presented as an intelligible unity, it appears to them reasonable, and, as the Catholic faith, it makes a real appeal with the weight of Catholic authority and the Catholic idea. Out of that kind of conviction we can begin to develop a sense of loyalty and duty to the living community to-day. Such a line of approach it is much more difficult to follow or to find for those not of the *intelligentsia*. They lack imagination and a sense of history, and both seem rather necessary for an adequate understanding of the claims of the Church of Christ if presented as an entirely fresh idea. But you can exaggerate this. Their sympathies are with the idea of the Church as something which is still a part of English tradition.

The contrast is always vaguely there between the Church as it ought to be — what the Church ought to mean and be to them — and what it actually is. The ideal of the Church speaking with authority, telling them what to believe, to some extent ordering the life of the individual and community, is there at the back of their minds. They have not entirely lost sense of the ideal; they are not likely to lose it at a time when the reading of history and English literature is increasing immensely throughout all schools. But it is the contrast between the ideal and the actual we and they are up against.

How present the actual English Church of to-day for their allegiance and loyalty?

THE ABIDING SIGNIFICANCE OF PROTESTANTISM

By the Rev. C. J. Wright, B.D.

THERE come times in the affairs of men when divergent tendencies of thought and practice, which by the reflective observer can be seen running through several preceding generations, focus themselves at a point and raise specific inescapable issues. The majority of men are uncritical—that is, unreflecting; they therefore are either unaware of, or do not interest themselves in, the inner significance of the tendencies which lead them to practice and believe as they do. Among a predominantly practical people such as ours, it is not until a practical issue, demanding a definite yea or nay, has been raised that uncritical acquiescence in widespread customs and beliefs comes to be generally questioned, their implications commonly scrutinised, their theoretical foundations determinedly examined.

Such a practical situation arose recently in the yea or nay that was demanded of the elected representatives of this country with respect to the revised Prayer Book. This practical situation was itself the result of a doctrinal situation: the former could not have arisen without the latter. For belief is always at the root of practice, and customs have their source—in spite of the depreciation of the claims of thought by those who do not feel themselves called to think—in theories. There would be no demand for the revision of Prayer Book or of any other book handed down to us by the past if the beliefs involved in the old books were not felt to be no longer entirely acceptable. The immediate issue of that practical situation is now past history, but inasmuch as there was witnessed in this country for a few months a very welcome concern with beliefs, the present would seem a favourable opportunity for a discussion of some of the ultimate issues involved.

The main, and weightiest, plea for the acceptance of the book—viz., the plea of the *comprehensiveness* of the Church—was rejected. In the rejection of that plea there was what to

the present writer was a very healthly indication, namely that the truth-loving and truth-seeking instinct of the nation can no longer be led to abdicate its claims before the comprehensive and merging exigencies of the practical situation. I say this, I trust dispassionately, and should wish to say it even if the judgment of the House of Commons had been contrary to my own. There is surely cause for profound thankfulness in the fact that Truth, or what men regard as Truth, was not esteemed as the dutiful servant of Peace, in the manifestation of the conviction that there can be no lasting peace except in the abode of truth. Those whose primary loyalty is to truth must always rejoice when they see on the part of any company of people the refusal to have an issue, which has been created by thought and doctrine, settled by utilitarian or pragmatic pleas, nor will this rejoicing, while it may be mitigated, be destroyed even if what we regard as a mistaken verdict on the issue be given.

Nor is this meant to suggest that the principle of comprehensiveness for any human institution can be summarily rejected. Human minds being what they are, that is congenitally diverse, some measure of 'comprehension' is unavoidable, and indeed desirable. The only point which arises is as to when comprehension must cease, as to where, in other words, differences can no longer cohere. It is one thing to tolerate, and indeed welcome, differences: it is quite another thing to attempt the merging of views and practices which are mutually contradictory or destructive. 'Let both grow together until the harvest' is the facile plea, so contradictory of the essential spirit of the Master's words, of those who would leave to posterity the decision on questions which are their own. There is a harvest for the truth-lover which is always *now*. Toleration, certainly — to all but to the false. The tenacity with which we hold our beliefs, or with which they hold us, is the measure of our opposition to contradictory beliefs. There come times when we cannot, without surrender of personal integrity, make concessions to beliefs which we hold to be false. The historian is aware that the problems of each successive generation have been in great part created by the worldly-wise concessions of those who in their own day were quite frequently regarded as 'statesmanlike thinkers.' Let us at least see to it that we in our

day do not make greater the problems of the future by refusing to confront the problems of our present. Let us, above all, repudiate *de coeur* that attitude of acquiescent and sceptical inertia which comforts itself with the assurance—'After us the deluge.' Let us refuse to acknowledge that the chief end of the mind is to be a jailer of thoughts.

The essential problem of our day is constituted by what are generally called Protestantism and Catholicism. These terms, used in a variety of senses and representing to the world at large certain institutional embodiments of Christianity, nevertheless stand each for a series of ideas which have astonishingly little in common with each other. I say *astonishingly* little, for it is certainly a very remarkable fact that movements so diverse in foundation principles should each regard themselves as *Christian*. Is not the refusal to think out, and courageously face, the abiding significance of these respective series of ideas responsible for some of the acute practical difficulties of to-day? This refusal has, I know, been dictated by an engrossment with practical considerations, and a measure of sympathy will not be withheld from the ecclesiastical administrators of our time. Nevertheless, here is a situation which calls less for administrative efficiency than for thought efficiency. Is not the way out the way straight through? Administration must be the servant of, and not the ruler over, principle. A refusal to return from a one-sided engrossment with practical considerations to the essential thought position for which true Protestantism stands can but result in yet acuter practical difficulties in the days to come. And in saying this, I am chiefly mindful of the general movement towards *Union* so evident in our generation. Now Union or Re-union among the Churches is to be unhesitatingly welcomed and furthered, provided it is seen to be merely a *practical* task demanded or inspired by the desire for a more effective presentation of Christian truth to a bewildered age and a less ambiguous manifestation of that Christian charity which makes men free and makes men one. When, however, it is regarded as a *dogma*, as an end in itself required by a certain conception of the Church, there is an explicit surrender of the essential content of Protestantism. For a union of essential Protestantism with essential Catholicism is impossible without the disappearance of the former.

We could wish, in this respect, that there was in Protestantism a little more of the logic which is so conspicuous (even if, as we hold, so conspicuous in support of false ideas) in Roman Catholicism. We could wish, in other words, that the issues were as clearly seen by Protestantism as by Catholicism. Our practical zeal, and our sentimentalism, have led us, I imagine, as far as we can go. Is it not time that a plea was made for the difficult task of confronting basal differences? and this, not with any desire to harden or intensify oppositions, but only in the interests of that truthfulness of spirit which forbids their mitigation or obscuration? In an age when the deep feelings of our common humanity have been stirred to the depths it has been easier to feel than to see or to think. In the stream of warm and pious zeal one power, one institution—there has been a certain refreshment in perceiving—has refused to be carried away. The Roman Church knows where she is: she has thought her position through. Unhesitatingly she repudiates any movements towards Union which have not their basis in an uncompromising submission to herself in doctrine and in jurisdiction. 'So, Venerable Brethren,' as Pius XI addresses his captains and lieutenants in his recent Encyclical *Mortalium animos nunquam* (an Encyclical which can be heartily commended for perusal to those non-Romanists who betray so profound an 'inferiority complex' in the presence of their Roman brethren) 'it is clear why this Apostolic See has never allowed its subjects to take part in the assemblies of non-Catholics: for the union of Christians can only be furthered by promoting the return to the one true Church of Christ of those who are separated from it, for in the past they have unhappily left it. To the one true Church of Christ, we say, which is visible to all, and which is to remain, according to the will of its Author, exactly the same as He instituted it. During the lapse of centuries, the mystical Spouse of Christ has never been contaminated, as Cyprian bears witness: "The Bride of Christ cannot be made false to her Spouse: she is incorrupt and modest. She knows but one dwelling, she guards the sanctity of the nuptial chamber chastely and modestly." . . . Furthermore, in this one Church of Christ no man can be or remain who does not accept, recognize, and obey the authority and supremacy of Peter and his legitimate successors. Did not the ancestors of those who are

now entangled in the errors of Photius and the reformers obey the Bishop of Rome, the chief shepherd of souls? . . . . Let, therefore, the separated children draw nigh to the Apostolic See, set up in the City which Peter and Paul, the Princes of the Apostles, consecrated by their blood; to that See, We repeat, which is "the root and womb whence the Church of God springs," not with the intention and the hope that "the Church of the living God, the pillar and ground of the truth," will cast aside the integrity of the faith and tolerate their errors, but, on the contrary, that they themselves submit to its teaching and government.'

This uncompromising attitude of Rome is determined by the inherent logic of a position from which, without self-stultification, there can be no departure. Rome, by that very position, is more deeply concerned with the union of Christendom than is Protestantism; but under no circumstances can she give official approval to the gatherings for the *exploration* of the possibilities of Union. Approval can only be given provided there is at the outset the acknowledgment on the part of Protestants that there is nothing to *explore*: it is simply a matter of submission to her claims, of the acceptance of the whole series of ideas which compacted together constitute essential Catholicism.

Wherein lies the fundamental divergence between the whole Catholic system and the content of a liberal and enlightened Protestantism? To the present writer it seems that the crux of the matter is to be found at the question of *Authority*.

The claim of Catholicism is that there is at present in the world as an institution which is unlike all other institutions in this respect, that she is subject to a 'supernatural' guidance which secures her from all error and which thus ensures for her dogmatic pronouncements the infallibility of Truth itself. This claim is perhaps the most remarkable phenomenon in our modern thought-world. To the philosophical historian of 5,000 years hence its persistence among, and its at least formal acceptance by, so large a section of civilized humanity will, I imagine, be regarded as the most signally strange characteristic of the thought-world of these our times. Of this claim I may be allowed to state, as far as possibly impartially, that it reveals in its makers at the same time a profound knowledge of psy-

chology and a tenacious and determined regard for the perpetuation of the system with which it is associated. For the distinguishing characteristic of the modern thought-world is the *search for truth*. Now this very search contains within itself the confession that the complete discovery of truth has not yet been reached. The profound knowledge of psychology evidenced by Rome is seen when we consider the reactions, inevitable in the present stage of mental evolution, occasioned in so many minds by the new knowledge which is continually rewarding man's search and by the attitude of free enquiry which occasions that search. That reaction in the case of the unreflecting many is bewilderment; in the case of the reflecting and believing, but finally sceptical, few is fear. The bewildered will ever listen to those who speak with dogmatic authority: like our children they like to be reassured. Catholicism represents the parental reassurer of Christendom's children. In this role Protestantism can have no hope of vieing successfully, nor, if she understands her own nature, will she make the attempt. To the believing and reflecting few who are afraid of thought Catholicism represents itself as a haven of refuge from the interior tempest, and as a bulwark against the advance of liberal thought. The case of Newman, who felt that the alternatives were Roman Catholicism and Atheism, will occur to every mind.

The only question which concerns us here is: Is this claim to be an infallible authority true? Or, to make the issue a less sectional one, Is there such a thing as an external authority in religion?

There are many ways in which an enquiry into this question might be undertaken. It might, for example, be approached *historically*, that is to say, the past 'infallible' utterances of any institution which claims such 'authority' can be compared with the conclusions which have been reached and approved by the *concensus* of enlightened and competent minds in the world today. If the first are in accord with the second, then on historical grounds the claim, it may be said, has not been invalidated—though even then it has not been proved. If it is quite customary to find the first at variance with the second, then most minds will unhesitatingly repudiate the claim to 'infallible authority' so advanced and, perhaps with a certain amusement, perhaps with a certain sadness, watch the endeavours of dubi-

ous subtlety on the part of the protagonists of this claim to explain away the very fallible utterances of infallibility. In the light of such historical investigations there are no 'infallibilities' of the type either desiderated or claimed. Nor does history lend any support to the conception of *unchanging*—though as the Roman apologist hastens to add, not undeveloping—dogmas with which this claim is harnessed. The conception of unchanging dogma is a myth. Why, it may be asked, is this fact not recognised by 'Catholic' apologists? The answer is that fundamental presuppositions will not permit their recognition. It is easier to get round history than to escape from the presuppositions which are integral to the existence of the institution to which one has given allegiance. 'To alter, or to admit error in the past, is equivalent to accusing God of a lie,' such is the apologetic declaration. From which it is seen that one is not free to investigate history with scientific impartiality to discover whether there is, or is not, error in the past: one must approach this investigation with the presupposition that ecclesiastical dogma is the utterance of God, Who, assuredly, cannot be accused of a lie.[1]

Leaving however this historical approach to the question under consideration to avowed historians, I approach it along what I may call a common-sense investigation into the *nature of religion* itself.

Now, this nature may be described objectively, or subjectively. In other words, we may state how religion appears as a historical phenomenon—that is, we may describe the beliefs, the practices, the emotions of those who have been regarded as religious people. *Or*, we may state how religion appears to us *from the inside*. This latter method of approach represents the presupposition that we are only in a position to talk about religion in so far as we have personal experience of it.

I confess myself unable to escape this latter presupposition, which means, I presume, that I am by inescapable nature Protestant. Nor can I equate religion either with the *philosophy of religion* or with *cult*: it is in primary essence a personal, interior experience. That religion is not the equivalent of a

[1] It would be interesting, though I fear not very profitable, to scrutinize more closely this assertion. It being admitted that lies are told by silences and suppressions as well as by forthright utterance, such a God would seem to be involved in little else.

philosophy of religion is obvious from the fact that the majority of religious people would be quite unable to explicate in intellectual formulation or dialectic the *contents* of their religion; the absence of this ability will not be held to indicate the absence of a religious experience. And that religion is not in its essence a cult is obvious, I think, from the fact that some of the most religious people have little or any cult—or what is regarded as such: the testimony of the saints and the seers is that increasing insight delivers one from the necessity of the form, the letter, the institution, the season, the place. 'Neither in this mountain nor in Jerusalem shall ye worship the Father . . . God is Spirit: and they that worship Him must worship Him in spirit and in truth.' Beholding the New Jerusalem, the seer of Patmos said: 'I saw no temple therein.'

Furthermore, this *interiority* (if I may use the word) of religion is not merely revealed or implied in the two facts just adduced—the dialectical incapacity of the majority of religious people and the insights of the saintly and prophetic few—it is, I think, established by any common-sense enquiry into the origin of religion. For whenever or however what we call religion began on this planet it began, is it not obvious, within a human mind and within a human heart. Whether it began in response to a question as to the meaning of things, or in a vague 'feeling of dependence,' or in a dim awareness of a Beyond, an Above, a Higher-than-I, at least it began *within*. Doubtless it is idle to speculate on the original content of religion in the world: at least it is futile to draw rigid distinctions between the emotional and the intellective faculties of man, and to find the origin in one rather than in the other. For we cannot split up our personal life in this way. My only point is that the term religion represents an experience; it first had its birth in a human heart and mind. And in saying this I am not raising any question as to its ultimate source and origin, and am certainly far from questioning my own basal conviction that the birth of this experience was a gift from above. That it was primarily an experience within someone is simply a psychological commonplace—a scientific fact, if you will—and has nothing to say to the philosophical question as to Divine origin or pure Naturalism.

Throughout the uncharted ages that have since elapsed, the

emotions and the beliefs—with the consequent practices—which have come to characterise 'religion' have become more clearly defined and articulated. Chiefly through the pressure of intellective reflections, precision has been given to beliefs, the theological content of religion, from which it is indeed inseparable, has been more and more explicitly formulated.

In all this age-long history where has been *Authority*? Now at this point it is necessary to interrogate the word itself. If by Authority we are to mean a body of people who have sought to impose upon others the beliefs they hold or to submit to the especial hierarchical position they have come to claim for themselves, then every age and every people has had such Authorities. Or, if by Authority we are to mean not the people themselves but the *power* they have to enforce obedience or to coerce beliefs, then such Authority is everywhere; but its universality does not necessarily commend it as right.

> 'Proud man
> Dress'd in a little brief authority,—
> Most ignorant of what he's most assured,
> His glassy essence,—like an angry ape,
> Plays such fantastic tricks before high heaven
> As make the angels weep.'

Or, if by Authority we are to mean neither the people who claim it nor their power of enforcement, but the beliefs, the practices themselves, adhered to and observed, and sought to be perpetuated through succeeding generations, then such Authorities are to be found among all peoples in the world today. None of these uses of the term is adequate. For to claim to be, or to have, Authority is obviously a very different thing from really being, or having, Authority. No reflecting man will acknowledge that those who have been most determined in the assertion of their authority have had most authority to assert. Furthermore it is a psychological commonplace that in the present state of general mental evolution on this planet a dogmatic and uncompromising claim to Authority is the worldly-wise way of gaining adherents. The discussion here is not about practical ways of perpetuating a system, a hierarchy, an institution, but about the truth or otherwise of the claim made; the distinction, therefore, between *claiming* and *being* Authority stands. Our knowledge of the facility with which men can rationalise practical or institutional exigencies

must ever put us on our guard against the surrender of our intellects to those who most determinedly claim it. The advance of truth in every sphere—the religious included—has only been secured by those who refused to surrender the peremptoriness of their own personal insights to the claims of a codified and institutionalized past. Nor have we any reason for supposing that future progress will be gained in any other way.

Religion, then, had its birth in the emotional, intellective and practical response to the whole universe in which man found himself. What men call *Authorities* have been begotten of the pedagogic endeavour to organize and systematize these responsive insights and inferences. The *raison d'être* of these institutionalizations and systematizations is that succeeding generations should inherit such 'revelations,' and so, in the light that has been given, press on in the upward journey. *Authorities* are by their essential nature *conservative*, that is, they seek to conserve the gains of the past. The future, apart from them, would have to begin the long road *de novo*. *Authority*, however, as rightly employed, is not just the singular number of *authorities*. For it is not something external, it is not a practical or pedagogic creation. Authority is just another name for the truth gained by, the insight given to, the past. The misfortune is that in organizing past insights their essential character is lost: they become entombed in structures created for their perpetuity. The office of the prophet is to see; the office of the priest and of the administrator is to conserve his visions. But in so doing, these latter—such is the frailty of human nature—jealous of the primacy in this order, turn the tables by claiming for their office or their handiwork an uncritical submission from the future which the prophet himself is ever the first to repudiate. Hence the perpetual oppositions of 'authorities' to those who by their personal insights and investigations disturb security and peace. 'I came not to cast peace on the earth but a sword,' said He to Whose revelation our supreme religious indebtedness belongs. 'O Jerusalem, Jerusalem,' such was His own experience, 'which killeth the prophets, and stoneth them that are sent unto her! how often would I have gathered thy children together, even as a hen gathereth her chickens under her wings, and ye would not!'

It is for such reasons that we say there is no such thing as an external authority, properly speaking, in religion. Religion is a personal insight, a personal belief, a personal ethic. In claiming finality what men call authorities have surrendered to the subtlest of all forms of atheism—that which declares that God has spoken His last word, has done His last deed. Nor is it any answer to this indictment to claim that God has created covenanted channels for the perpetual flow of the once-said word, the once-achieved deed of grace. In every age the prophetic voice has declared, not Thus *hath said* the Lord, but Thus *saith* the Lord.

I am well aware that this emphasis seems at first sight to deliver us over to a subjectivism which leaves us without the security of a stable objective criterion. This has ever been one of the main pleas in the polemics of Catholicism. If every prophet is his own 'authority' where is to be found our Authority? History tells us of two main ways in which escape has been sought from this seeming uncharted subjectivism. The first is the Catholic way, already referred to. The Church herself is the final Authority. When her Head feels it expedient to speak *ex cathedra* the infallible truth has been spoken. The second is the way of Scholastic Protestantism. That movement which found its leader in Luther and began as a 'protest' against the abuses and superstitions of institutional Christianity found itself, owing to polemical exigencies, led to construct a doctrine of external Authority. The infallible Book took the place of the infallible Church. The prophetic subjectivism of Luther — to whom there was 'a bible within the bible,' to whom, in other words, the value of biblical writings was dependent on the emphasis they gave to the doctrine which he regarded as central—gave way to a dogmatic objectivism, *in principle* precisely similar to the infallible objectivism of the Catholicism it replaced. In the interests of polemic the Scriptures degenerated into a collection of *dicta probantia* for the doctrines set forth in the Confessions. Where, then, is *Authority*? *Lo here*, said Catholicism, in this visible institution, with this visible head. *Lo there*, said Protestantism, in this visible Book. When questions arise, then let us turn up our *authorities*, the infallible utterances of the Church, the proof-texts of the Bible.

It can hardly be doubted that these two types of apologetic were *in principle* the same. Often, I know, it is claimed by Roman apologists that their seat of authority has this superiority over the seat of authority of scholastic Protestantism, that it represents a 'living voice' instead of a dead book. Unfortunately, the 'living voice' is more to be likened to a kind of gramophone record, and a very imperfect one at that. For living insight most of us would rather go to the utterances of, shall we say, the Gospels than to the dogmatizations of the Church. Few people would to-day dream of going to ecclesiastical assembles with their, perhaps inevitable, careful balancings, cautious inertias and timidities, their dominant regard for the practical situation, for the 'living voice' of truth and spiritual insight. And Church history tells us nothing of any such assemblies different from those we ourselves know. Indeed, if comparison must be made it is, I think, open to us moderns to claim that our present assembles have this superiority over those of the past—that they are more definitely aware of the perils which beset them. No! so far from being called to admit superiority with respect to its seat of authority, Scholastic Protestantism might justly claim that it were better to turn to a period of glorious insight than to listen to the institutional reiterations.

Both these endeavours, however, to escape from the perils of subjectivity were mistaken. It is futile to claim as objectively infallible an institution or a book whose obvious fallibility historical research increasingly manifests. Such claims result in all kinds of unhealthy dialectic devices, and these but harden the heart of a perplexed but truth-loving age. In addition to the spurious subtleties to show that Infallibility allows room for inescapeable fallibilities, we have the whole unhappy heritage of ecclesiastical antagonisms to historical research. From the days of Richard Simon, 'the father of biblical criticism.'[2] down to quite recent days that burden has gone on increasing in size and weight. Then, further, we have the terrible eras when the ethics of Jesus were transmuted both by Catholicism and by Protestantism into the coercive ethics of persecution—this by many conscientious men in the interests

[2] His *Histoire critique du Vieux Testament,* as originally printed, was seized and destroyed — the 1,300 copies — in consequence of ecclesiastical opposition. Protestant theologians were among Simon's opponents.

of the perpetuation of infallible truth.. The funeral piles of Latimer on the one hand, and of Servetus on the other could both be defended as 'necessary to the preservation' of infallible authority—likewise the Cross of Christ.

Happily, in the case of Protestantism, it has come to be generally seen that this method of escape is impossible. Our historical students do not require to toe the line of ecclesiastical requirements before publishing their works. Their books are, happily for the peace of mind of the reader, without the *nihil obstat* of the theological and ecclesiastical censors.

There is for essential Protestantism only one authority—and that is Truth. This authority is by its very nature a self-evidencing authority; it claims no external coercive powers. It depends for its recognition only upon such qualities as mental enlightenment and spiritual insight. Nor does the true Protestant regard himself as self-sufficient, however he may stress 'the right of private judgment.' He seeks to equip himself in order that he may be able to recognise the best and truest judgment of the past and of the present. Only, he is constitutionally unwilling to construct barriers and to lock doors. He listens eagerly to the past, and learns avidly from the past, but his gaze is towards the future. His watchword is not simply, 'Receive ye,' but 'Seek ye.' The past is for him a guide and not a tyrant. His inseparable companion is freedom. 'Where the Spirit of the Lord is there is liberty,' and, as he believes, truth. Acquiescence, inspired whether by expediency or by mental and spiritual sloth, has no part or lot with him.

The 'authority' both of Bible and of Church is subject to this self-evidencing quality of truth. As a matter of psychological fact, the authority of both is only for those who feel and perceive that in them which is *authoritative*. The true Protestant is content to have it so. The way that thus stretches ahead will doubtless seem both to administrator and to priest a slow way, a long way, a dangerous and uncertain way—a journey for humanity beset by all the hazards of ignorance, of materialism and of superstition. Without doubt it is beset by these hazards. Nevertheless, it is the only way : truth is always thus beset. She has no abiding happiness in any worldly-wise alliances such as may seem to gain for her short-cuts, which she knows intuitively must be fallacious. She dis-

trusts those who shun her until she is popular, knowing that their real comrade is Falsehood. Heine's words concerning Lessing might be spoken of her. 'He made not the least concession to falsehood even if thereby, after the manner of the worldly-wise, he could advance the victory of truth itself.'

Essential Protestantism risks the hazards inherent in the methods by which Truth claims general recognition. Even Roman Catholicism cannot escape this subjective reference. 'Obey me,' she says. 'Why?' I ask; and I can only obey in so far as I can see the truthfulness, the reasonableness, of the reasons she gives. 'Il me faut des raisons pour soumettre ma raison.' Whoever accepts the claims of Rome proclaims by his very acceptance that there is no escape from subjectivity. For it is he himself who accepts; no one can do so for him.

Let this fact be recognised, and it will be seen that the real and abiding difference between Catholicism and Protestantism is that while the former is inseparable from a system which seeks to impose itself upon the human mind, the latter depends on the intrinsic nature and appeal of truth itself. Of the former it may be said that it reveals a profound knowledge of, and reliance upon, the frailties of the human mind; of the latter it may be said that it reveals a profound trust in the man and the mind that is yet to be, progressively enlightened by all the truth which will continue to reward the search of the faithful remnant in every age. Of the former it may be said that its claim that a visible institution is a 'continuation of the Incarnation' is a blasphemy which no one acquainted with history and enlightened by the spirit of Christ would dare to believe. Of the latter it may be said that it can only see the 'continuation of the Incarnation' in the saintly and truth-loving of each generation, irrespective of their institutional allegiance. The former regards the Institution as an end in itself, and this because it holds it to be a 'supernatural' creation. The latter regards the Institution as a means to an end, and refuses to recognise the 'supernatural' in that which does not reveal the self-evidencing qualities of goodness, truth and insight.

Nor does this mean that Protestantism is precluded by this liberty from taking her stand by any dogmatic pronouncements, from asserting a creed, from declaring a message. My own conviction of the truth of any Christian credal assertion is com-

patible with a welcome given to every sincere discussion of such assertions, no matter whether the conclusion reached harmonizes with my own or not. The coercion of discussion, indeed, is the customary indication of the lack of such conviction. I will, therefore, state in conclusion two propositions which I regard it as essential for Protestant Christianity to maintain.

The first is a proposition as to the historic Jesus, whom we call the Christ. In Him there is for us revealed at once 'the name and the nature' of God, and His will for humanity. He is 'the effulgence of His Glory, and the very image of His substance.' We have here, I know, a metaphysical or theological affirmation, and it may be set forth, as historically it has been, in various modes of expression. I am not here, however, concerned with a discussion of the many Christologies. I merely wish to state that the affirmation which, in spite of their differences, is common to them is of the essence of the message which Protestantism with its freedom of enquiry has to make to the world. True to the Spirit of Him who in the days of His flesh refused to negative His own insight in obedience to the religious 'authorities' of His day, Protestantism, if it understands its own nature, will not be afraid of 'the inner light.' But it will at the same time ever recognise 'the light of the knowledge of the glory of God in the face of Jesus Christ' as the 'master-light of all our seeing'; and will not hesitate to say of a revelation given in history—*it is so*. 'In Him is the yea.'

> There may be other Words for other worlds,
> But for this world the Word of God is Christ.

The second is a proposition as to the *source* and *inspiration* of the search which the true Church of God makes in every age for the 'more light' which is to break through from every fact which the universe has for our teaching. The faith in, and the quest for, the truth inherent in all that the universe has to give is of God Himself. The discipline of the search is His way. The faith which inspires the search is His gift. This is the *testimonium Spiritus Sancti*. In all the age-long travail of truth, in all the striving after the beautiful that is good and the good that is beautiful, in all the quest of 'the city which hath the foundations,' we recognise the leadings of the Divine Spirit, Who is both source and goal. *Deus illuminatio mea. In lumine tuo videbimus lumen.*

PROLEGOMENA TO PRESENT PERPLEXITIES

By the Rev. E. P. Boys Smith, M.A., Vicar of Hordle, Hants.

THE precarious foundation on which some Anglo-Catholics' claim for disestablishment rests, is well shown by the Bishop of Durham's somersault. So long as he stood for the Church, he stood manfully for an established Church, knowing well that the establishment which in England is its historical heritage is one of the best guarantees of its comprehensiveness, and its internal freedom, no less than of its real religious service to the national life. But having come to the conclusion that the Enabling Act was logically and legally a denominational measure, he no longer stands for either the establishment or the Church. His policy would do away with establishment, and with that would go all claim on behalf of Anglicanism to be the Church in this country. It would be frankly one among several Christian Denominations; perhaps the one with most prestige and influence, but these might decline so that some other Denomination came to fill the place of primacy; and in any event it would be unable to stand on any other principle than such as every Denomination can claim. Are Anglo-Catholics prepared to accept the support of the Bishop on his own terms, and abandon at once their title to be recognised as either the Church or the National organ of Christianity? There is a certain logic in the Bishop's position, but little in that of any who refuse to substitute Denominationalism for Catholicity, and yet seek to sever the Ecclesiastical Institution from the real life of the English Community, because the links between them necessitate mutual responsibility, consideration and control. Catholicity is a wide word; it involves capacity for meeting and serving all the religious needs of men of many types found in the whole community, *i.e.*, in the nation. It cannot be sundered from comprehensiveness: it must admit of both variety and tolerant sympathy. It is not compatible with close definition, or with arrogance. Law, when this is the expression of a thousand years' continuous experience of a great people, as it is in England, is

one of the surest means of attaining and upholding real Catholicity.

II.

So soon as thoughts are turned to the relations between Church and State, someone is found to quote the saying, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' By all means; but let it be quoted with the meaning of the Lord Jesus who spoke it, not with the mediaeval misunderstanding which makes it contradict this. The latter is the usual way in which it is employed, so let the real sense of the words be examined.

Some Pharisees and Herodians laid a trap for Jesus by the question: 'Is it lawful to give tribute to Caesar or not?' They supposed they had him on the horns of a dilemma: 'Yes,' and they would denounce him as a traitor to God's people and afraid to keep His Law; 'No,' and they would delate him to the Procurator as one who preached sedition. The dilemma rested on the underlying assumption that human life may be divided under the contrasted headings of what is religious and what is secular. Religious duty, they considered, precluded the support of a heathen and alien government; the demand for tribute was secular, and its only sanction was force. Jesus called for a current coin, pointed to Caesar's effigy, and then gave the utterance which overwhelmed his questioners, 'Render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and unto God the things that are God's.' The essential fact is that *they were overwhelmed*. They found the answer a complete surprise, and felt it was conclusive. Why so? Because it involved entire rejection of the assumption they had taken for granted so confidently. Jesus denied distinction between religious and secular. He boldly answered, 'Render to Caesar. . . . and to God. . . .' He affirmed that in paying tribute to Caesar, the heathen ruler, they had their opportunity of fulfilling a religious duty which they owed to God. The answer did not mean render to Cæsar some things and to God other things, but render what the law of the land requires and *thereby* render what God requires of you.[1]

[1] καὶ does sometimes express such identity: *e.g. Mt.* xiii, 52, where καινὰ καὶ παλαιὰ does not mean 'some new things and other old things,' but 'things both new and old at the same time.' The householder produces what has long been stored away, and is now put to quite a new service. That is an exact description of the way Jesus quoted the Scriptures, and every Scribe who became a disciple should do the like.

That this is certainly the meaning of Jesus' utterance reflection makes clear on several grounds. In no other way can the words carry a reply to confound the questioners. Had Jesus meant that some things were due to Cæsar and others to God, that was exactly the view which the Pharisees and Herodians held. His answer would have been a feeble evasion, for it would have left undetermined to which group of things the tribute belonged; and Jesus would have been trying to ride off easily on a mere generality while jibbing at the question with which He was confronted. His questioners would have known very well how to deal with evasion like that. But they were staggered, for Jesus' whole outlook was such as they had not conceived possible. From His point of view, the tribute to Cæsar was certainly an obligation, for it was in fact a religious obligation in God's sight. The premisses on which their dilemma was so carefully constructed were shattered; this turned out no dilemma at all, but a mere futility. And while Jesus' opponents were left in no doubt of what He meant, so too His own followers completely understood Him. St. Paul is merely repeating his Master when he says, 'There is no power but of God; and those that be are ordained of God. Therefore he that resisteth the power withstandeth the ordinance of God' (*Rom.* xiii, 1). And then with pointed allusion to this saying of Jesus, he adds of Cæsar's tax collectors, 'They are ministers (Λειτουργοὶ) of God's service attending continually upon this very thing.' He condenses in the word Λειτουργοὶ Jesus' own assertion that he who pays 'secular' taxes is meeting religious requirements, and so the civil servants of Cæsar are in fact sacred ministers of God for this end.

The mediaeval mind was and is so under the sway of its own dualism, that even more than the Pharisees of old it cannot rise to the Christian standpoint, but draws a broad distinction between civil and religious, between Church and State. There is no such vital distinction in reality, as there is not in a Christian view; and any attempt to delimit the things of Cæsar, *i.e.* the secular, from the things of God, *i.e.* the spiritual, is as futile as it is unchristian. Jesus' saying, rightly understood, affords luminous guidance in our present perplexities; but misunderstood, as the mediaevalist misunderstood it, the words are made to contradict their own meaning, and are used as an anti-

Christian weapon. For us in this country, there is no question of monetary 'tribute' in dispute, but there is dispute concerning what is 'due' to the Church or the State. The 'dues' are dues of allegiance or legal obligation, and concern the law that is to be recognized and obeyed. In particular, Has the Deposited Book the mind of the Church behind it notwithstanding rejection by Parliament, or is it without lawful authority altogether, and to be regarded as dead since its rejection? The tenour of Jesus' saying if translated into the terms of our present problem would seem to be, 'Render willing obedience to the Law of the State, and thereby render to God the religious obedience He requires.' The claim that is made by the Bishop of Durham and others for 'spiritual independence' of the Church is identical with the claim of the Pharisees which Jesus altogether rejected. It rests, as theirs did, on the false assumption that life can be bisected into religious and secular. In cannot; any more than a living body can be bisected without all the life draining away. Jesus repudiated every such view. He taught His disciples moreover with all the emphasis He could that they were to make no claims to spiritual independence, authority, or power, but were to set before themselves His own ideal of service as the means and measure of greatness in the sight of God. There can be no doubt for any Christian that the Church in England will be greatest when without self-regard its whole mind is bent on rendering religious service to the great community of the English people, to the utmost of its capacity. History proves plainly that during many generations this capacity has been enlarged by its establishment; and it is hard to see any reason why that should not continue true in the future, or how disestablishment can possibly add to its power of Christian service.

III.

If there is one characteristic of human life more invariable than any other, it is that our experience is always concrete and particular; it is never abstract or general. So we keep closest to the realities of experience, closest to facts, when we deal with what is concrete. 'Wrapped in the pale winding-sheet of general terms,' thought is too often found dead. In the problem that confronts us to-day this needs to be constantly borne

in mind. Both 'Church' and 'State' are abstractions; the concrete fact in both cases consists in living persons. And to a very large extent in the very same persons. If the ideal of a National Church were realised, all the members of the community would be Christians, and all the Church would consist of members of the nation. No one would be any more representative of the Church than of the nation, nor *vice versa.* Ideals never are realised, but they indicate the true aim, and the true policy is to secure the closest approximation which is practicable.

It is certainly the Christian view that a whole human life, whether of an individual or of a community, involves and implies experience which is both civil and spiritual, both religious and secular, these terms not being antithetic but complementary. A man who would reach the fulness of manhood must belong to both the Church and State where his lot is cast. A community which is to attain full stature must be organized religiously and in civil relations; it must be a Church and a State. And as either Church or State it may have a lesser, and a wider, allegiance if it form one of a group of communities which are organized mutually in larger religious or national relations. But always it is the living person or community which is the vital fact; as soon as we hypostatize the organization as either 'Church' or 'State,' we are departing from contact with reality. This is a besetting danger, and never more than when problems of Church and State are discussed.

A further warning is greatly required. Too often it is tacitly assumed that the Church is in some sense a 'Divine Society,' while the State is not. The assumption is entirely groundless. If the terms are employed as abstractions, God made neither; what He made is the living community. This organizes itself, not without His continual operation. He gives 'grace' for this in secular affairs no less than in religious affairs, the fact being that there is no real distinction between these affairs and those, but only between the religious apprehension and conduct of them, and the non-religious view and treatment of them. The distinction between religious and secular is not in the things, but in the mind or soul which deals with them, and which turns them to religious or secular ends. It is the express teaching of the New Testament that what is called the State is just as much the creation or ordinance of God as is the Church. And His Spirit

finds a home in the one as in the other, the fact being that the home found is not the organization in either case, but the humanity which is organized.

Where general terms and abstractions are the seed sown, false assumptions and false conclusions soon make a plentiful crop which has to be harvested. There are no more disastrous seeds to-day than the terms 'Church' and 'State.' The free use of the latter in Germany a couple of decades ago was a main cause of the great war; and the free use of the former in England these last two decades is a principal cause of our unhappy divisions in this land. We should do well to follow the strikingly concrete thought of one of the ablest minds in Europe—President Masaryk. He defines the State as 'the organization of natural co-operation.' This is the best definition ever given. And the Church may equally be so defined with this difference only, that it is natural co-operation in spiritual endeavours, aspirations and ventures that are in view in this latter case. The 'godly motions' that make the finest part of human nature crave for co-operation no less than physical needs and instincts; and the organization of the natural co-operation which springs out of all such 'godly motions,' constitutes the Church, whatever may be its form at a given moment, or its inherited traditions. Happy the community so shaped by an unbroken history, and so situate in its cultural, and political, and economic relations with all the world, that it is both free and able to organize the natural co-operation of its people, both spiritual and civil, into something like a unity of its common life, under the twofold aspect of a Christian State and a National Church. England is so blessed; to discard this singular divine blessing must be equally un-Christian, unwise and unthankful. Like every good gift of God, it carries with it further responsibility and further opportunity. It is for the Church of England to gird itself to meet them both, so enlarging the scope of our 'organization of natural co-operation' that it makes us also 'fellow-workers with God.'

WHAT IS TRUTH?

By the Rev. J. C. Hardwick, M.A., B.Sc.

S. John xviii, 38: 'Pilate saith unto him, What *is* truth?'

THERE is a picture by a Russian artist depicting this scene. No details are spared us. The figure of Christ is weary and haggard, exhausted by nervous and physical strain. He stands there, a wreck of a man, yet full of a certain dignity, the greater for being devoid of all outward trappings. It is the dignity of a man at the end of his tether — of a man who has fought and lost. Pilate, prosperous, full-fed, and a trifle coarse, is turning away with a look of cynical pity — pity for a man duped and betrayed by illusions. This dreamer had foolishly believed that the truth had been revealed to him, and (still more foolishly) that the people desired to hear it, and (more foolishly still) that they were capable of understanding it when heard.

'I came to bear witness to the truth,' He had said. But — What is truth? There are, indeed, opinions; but truth? Who can say? Why throw away life for something involved in uncertainty? No truth is so true as to merit our taking it seriously. Only the ignorant, the fanatical, the ill-bred, believe in truth. The cultured man knows it to be an illusion.

There is, of course, much to be said for this point of view, which is held as widely to-day as ever it was in the days of Pilate. Quite a fair proportion of our intellectuals hold it. To deny the existence of truth saves a world of trouble. Life, divested of dogma, can be lived without disturbance and without perturbation. Belief in truth has only bred in the human race fanaticism, intolerance, bitterness.

And if the mathematician or man of science should come along and put in a claim to be able to prove that certain propositions *are* true — *e.g.* that the three angles of a triangle equal two right-angles, or that water is a combination of oxygen and hydrogen — the reply to this, of those who think like Pilate, is that these truths, even if true, are of no real importance. 'Who wonders, and who cares?' Who would go to the stake for either

* A sermon preached in St. Paul's Cathedral on Sunday, February 24th, 1929.

of them? *It is only in the sphere of things indifferent that manifest truth is available.* As the poet wrote: 'Nothing worthy proving can be proven.'

In all the really important affairs of life we have to be content with *opinion*. For example, in matters of art. Is a Beethoven symphony more beautiful than the latest music-hall inanity? Who is to decide? If we count heads, the music-hall has it: and what proof is there that the crowd is wrong? There *is* no proof which, like a mathematical proof, will convince everybody. So also with architecture. Is the gin-palace preferable to the cathedral? Many people think so. Who is to prove them wrong? In art, who shall tell us what to admire, and teach us to admire it? Where is the objective standard of reference in this sphere of the beautiful? Are not all our ideas infected by relativity? And yet it is far more important to recognize beauty, and to know what to admire, than to know that the three angles of a triangle equal two right-angles. One can know this and still be a barbarian; but to know what is beautiful is to be civilized — to have *spiritual* knowledge.

And then there are truths about conduct, or ethical truths. These are even more important than truths about art, and yet who can tell us what they are? It has been said that there is nothing now thought wrong which was not once thought right, from patricide to incest. The slave-trade is a case in point. Men of notable piety engaged in it, and felt no qualms of conscience at the sufferings of the poor wretches under hatches. Were they right or wrong? They had no doubts; and we have no doubts. Yet our respective answers are contradictory.

Yet moral truth is something we cannot do without, since we cannot abstain from action. Indeed, inaction is itself a form of action. Here it is literally true that 'where there is no vision, the people perish.' Thus the paradox and tragedy seem to be that only the truths not worth knowing can be certainly known: that the truths which we live by, and which we must have or perish, are involved in impenetrable obscurity. Here, all is opinion merely: there can be no certainty. Surely this is an intolerable position? Let us consider it again, and try to discover why it is that moral and aesthetic truth is involved in far more obscurity than scientific truth.

(1) One reason is that in art and morals we are not dealing, as we are in mathematics and chemistry, with what can be exactly measured, and *exact measurement is the source of clear ideas.* You cannot exactly measure degrees of beauty and goodness. Ethical and aesthetic judgments are not quantitative. This is the first reason.

(2) The second reason is that in the sphere of the beautiful and the good, the powers of perception possessed by different individuals vary widely. What is self-evident to one man, may be doubtful or absurd to another. To me a Beethoven symphony may be so much noise; to you it may be a glimpse into an eternal world of beauty. So with the perception of moral qualities. No man, it is said, is a hero to his valet: but this is because the valet has no eye for heroism. It takes a hero to appreciate a hero, who very rarely looks the part. This principle of truth being evident only to a few is accepted in every sphere of artistic achievement. It is only the opinion of the few which is worth having, for it is only the few who know. Browning tells of the composer of an opera who

> 'Looked beyond the roaring and the wreaths
> Where sits Rossini silent in his stall.'

Rossini knew: and, compared with his approbation, popular applause was nothing.

How different in the sphere of science! In the case of our senses — and it is with the data which these supply that science is concerned—all normal men are similarly equipped. A pound weight is the same to everybody. There is a common, or universal, standard of reference. This is why the physical and chemical sciences can prove their statements: there exist common perceptions to which appeal is made. But in morals and in art there is not the same degree of common perception.

It is probable that in this sphere of the good and the beautiful only a minority have delicate perceptions, and, therefore, true knowledge. Spiritual things, said St. Paul, are spiritually perceived. And by 'spiritual things' he meant, not visions, auditions and psychic phenomena, but the sphere of the qualitative, *i.e.* the good and the beautiful. (It should be noted that this distinction between the qualitative, or what is *not* exactly

measurable, and the quantitative, or what *is* exactly measurable, is a far more important distinction than that between body and mind, the material and the immaterial — a distinction which is now entirely out of date.)

And since the good and the beautiful is only perceived by those who have ears to hear and eyes to see, Whitman's saying is literally true that 'Wisdom cannot be pass'd from one having it to another not having it.' You can only tell people what they know already. Such, then, are the reasons why in matters of art and morals (the beautiful and the good) there is often uncertainty about truth, and an absence of definite proofs to persuade everybody. *The first reason* is that these things are qualitative, not quantitative, *i.e.* not exactly measurable, so that mathematically clear ideas are impossible. *The second reason* is that men vary in their powers of perception in discerning beauty and goodness, so that the same truths cannot be made equally clear to everybody. To some they seem self-evident; to others, 'foolishness.'

How, then, are we to acquire delicacy of perception of beauty and goodness? Where, in a word, is wisdom to be found? Is it a natural gift; or can it be cultivated? Is spiritual truth attainable by all of us?

Our Lord was asked the same question: 'Are there few that be saved?' He gave no definite answer: His only reply was, 'Strive to enter in.' *Strive.* It would appear as if spiritual insight—perception of the beautiful and the good—were a reward for effort. The fact seems to be that only those who strive for themselves to create beauty and goodness — to make it actual in their own lives — attain knowledge of these things. It is by trying to practise goodness that we come, more and more, to understand goodness, and by striving to create beauty that we come to understand the beautiful. We live, as we say, and learn, *i.e.* life itself is the teacher, but not the undisciplined, the unexamined life. The way of enlightenment, therefore, is likely to be hard — 'narrow is the gate and strait is the way: and few there be that find it.' But at the end of the way there is reality, not illusion. That is to say, goodness and beauty are real things, 'laid up in heaven' (to use New Testament language), to which our ideas may more and more closely approximate.

It need hardly be stated that the best of human knowledge in these spheres is 'in part' only, as St. Paul said. But though partial, it is real knowledge. Our knowledge of the beautiful and the good may be a shadow: but it is a true shadow, and that of which it gives the outline is a reality — indeed, the supreme reality.

This is why, as our Lord taught, the truth is worth dying for: for it is a supreme value. This is something that the Pilates, the Gallios, the sceptics, will never understand.

BOOK REVIEWS

We regret that in our January issue the book reviewed under the heading 'The Excellence of Revealed Religion' was wrongly described in a footnote. The description should have been: *The Excellence of Revealed Religion*: an Enquiry into the Meaning of Revelation, by C. G. Challenger. (Cambridge University Press, 1928; 5/- net.)

PLOTINUS AND PROTESTANTISM*

Dr. Inge's work on Plotinus is already a classic, a masterpiece both of scholarship and of art. In his Introduction to this third edition, the Dean says: 'I wish the book to be regarded as a contribution to the philosophy of religion, rather than a treatise on general metaphysics. My last reading of Plotinus has only confirmed me in my conviction that his value as a religious philosopher can hardly be over-estimated. I know of no more powerful defence of the *religious* view of life, which bids us pass through things temporal "in the spirit of a worshipper," to use a phrase of Bishop Gore's.' To term this monumental work 'apologetic' has become (so base is the current use of that term) somewhat misleading; yet no such persuasive and convincing presentation of the religious attitude as these lectures has been produced in the last generation. In the first place, it differs from popular apologetic in understanding where the essence of religion, and especially of the Christian religion, lies; and also from much semi-scientific apologetic in not fearing to be primarily philosophical. The Dean does not talk about 'religious experience' without estimating its value. For him, 'Mysticism is the pursuit of ultimate, objective truth or it is nothing. . . . Not for one moment can it rest content with that neutrality or agnosticism with regard to the source and value of its intuitions, which the psychologist, as such, is pledged to maintain. . . . The mystic is not interested in the states of his consciousness. He cares very little whether he is conscious or unconscious, in the body or out of the body. But he is supremely interested in knowing God, and, if possible, in seeing Him face to face. His inner life is not an intensive cultivation of the emotions. It develops by means of what . . . Plotinus defines as 'the method and discipline which brings with it the power of pronouncing with final truth upon the nature and relation of things, also the knowledge of the good and of its opposite, of the eternal and of the temporal.'

It is evident that the study of Plotinus, like the study of Spinoza, does not leave the student where it found him. It results in something which

**The Philosophy of Plotinus.* By W. R. Inge, C.V.O., D.D. Third Edition. (Longman's. 21/- net.) *Protestantism.* By the Rev. W. R. Inge. (Ernest Benn. 6d.)

we may call a conversion of the soul. 'I have not found that he fails his disciples in good fortune or in ill. Like Wordsworth, he is an author whom a man may take up in trouble and perplexity, with the certainty of finding strength and consolation. . . . For he insists that spiritual goods alone are real; he demonetizes the world's currency as completely as the Gospels themselves. The good life is always within our power; and "if a man seeks from the good life anything beyond itself, it is not the good life that he is seeking."'

It is the Dean's view that 'we shall need all that religion and philosophy can do for us in the troublous time which certainly awaits us.' Nor does he merely call those who think as he does to retire from the world, but rather to regard themselves as called upon to save what is worth saving in it. 'What the Church did in the Dark Ages, the combined forces of Christianity and humanism must do now. . . . Our task is very much the same as that which was laid on Plotinus and his successors in their day. They also had a precious tradition to preserve. . . . For us, the whole heritage of the past is at stake together; we cannot preserve Platonism without Christianity, nor Christianity without Platonism, nor civilization without both.'

Such is the situation; and the business will probably be decided within the next hundred years. But perhaps the barbarians will get hold of Christianity and transform it into a superstition? This is why Dean Inge is doing such a service to our age by telling us what Christianity *is*. It is 'essentially a struggle for an independent spiritual life, and it can only exert its true influence in the world when it realizes that spiritual things are spiritually discerned, and when it stands on its own foundations, without those extraneous supports which begin by strengthening a religion and end by strangling it.' Moreover, Christianity, in strong contrast to certain modern attitudes, gives us a clear and definite standard of values, absolute and eternal. And this is of the utmost importance, because 'The vitally important thing is that we should believe in Goodness, Truth, and Beauty as Divine and absolute principles, the source and goal of the whole cosmic process, and not as the imaginings of the human mind, or ideal values which have no existence.'

These lectures on Plotinus present a point of view which is inevitably critical of the weaknesses of institutional religion. In his little book on *Protestantism,* the Dean says that this 'permanent factor in the evolution of religion' is essentially 'an attempt to check the tendency to corruption and degradation which attacks every institutional religion.'

'Religion embodied in an institution is like those chemical substances which are never found pure. The inspiration, or revelation, which gave it birth, and to safeguard which it embodied itself in an organized Church, partly congeals and partly evaporates. The religion, now identified with the institution, mixes itself with earlier forms of belief and traditional modes of worship; it finds room for primitive superstitions and hallowed traditions, changing rather the *nomina* than the *numina* of the cults which it supplanted. It is often entangled with the tortuous policy of a hierarchy greedy of power and pelf; it is drawn into secular politics and identified with non-religious interests.'

It is against developments of this kind that Protestantism has been and is a reaction: it is 'the revolt of genuine religion against this secularization. Almost always we find it advocating ethical purity against ceremonial rules, and individual freedom against ecclesiastical discipline.'

The development of Latin Catholicism is most ably summarized in this little volume:

'The Roman Church is a metaphysical entity clothed in flesh and blood. It is the 'glorious Church' of St. Paul, externalized and brought down from heaven to earth. In the course of its growth into an autocratic empire it provided itself with a mythological pedigree, like the legends of Romulus and Remus, and with forged title-deeds, such as the Donation of Constantine and the spurious Decretals. True to the traditional character of Rome, it willingly left to other churches the honours of philosophy and mysticism; its function was to rule. Almost instinctively it revived the miraculous claims by which the older priesthoods had established their power. The arts and crafts of sacerdotalism have never been exploited with such pertinacity and ingenuity.'

Yet the Dean is alive to certain defects in Protestantism, defects of insight and imagination, which have sometimes escaped the notice of its friends, though not of its critics. It is inferior to Catholicism in its knowledge of human nature, and the Protestant takes his religion seriously and in solitude. Moreover, in his preoccupation with ethics, he undervalues the aesthetic side of life, and fails to appreciate how large a place poetry plays in life. 'For him a myth must be a hard fact or a wicked lie; sacramental symbolism is fraudulent magic'; all the pretty world of half-belief must be swept away. But Protestantism is still in the making. The nations of Northern Europe, where it flourishes, are still intellectually and spiritually immature. There has been a confusion in their spiritual life, a want of clarity in estimating values, and a lack of disciplined thought. Yet these are the vagaries of a young and half-formed civilization. 'The Christianity of Northern Europe and North America has still a long and vigorous career before it; it will certainly recover from its present depression.' Yet it must undergo great changes; 'there can be no return to Luther and Calvin.'

This most hopeful and stimulating book should be bought by everyone: it sheds more light on present religious problems than many a more pretentious volume. J.C.H.

THE CÆSAREAN TEXT OF MARK.*

This enlarged number of the *Harvard Theological Review* is really a complete book of all but 200 pages. It brings to a climax a long and very important investigation into one of the most interesting problems of textual criticism as applied to the Gospels. As long ago as 1902, Prof. Lake contributed to 'Texts and Studies,' Vol. VII, 'Codex I of the Gospels and its Allies,' a new transcript of this important MS. with an elaborate Introduction. He saw the intimate relation (once you go below the surface) between this family of MSS., the Ferrar group, and the MSS. numbered respectively 28, 565 and 700. But very little notice was taken of this at the time.

Some years later, von Soden threw the whole subject into confusion with his theory of an I-text—to which he referred not only these MSS. (and the newly-discovered Koridethi MS., Θ), but also D and the Old Latin. Prof. Lake came to the rescue of the subject again in an article in the *Harvard Theological Review* for July, 1923, in which he showed that in reality Θ was the oldest and most important MS. of the family to which the above-mentioned Minuscules belong. And he made it clear that they represented an ancient text—partially corrected, but differently in the different MSS. concerned, to the Byzantine standard—which stands, roughly speak-

**The Caesarean Text of the Gospel of Mark.* By Kirsopp Lake, Robert P. Blake and Silva New.

ing, half-way between the text of B and that of D, while having a number of characteristic readings of its own.

At this point I myself was able to lend a hand, having fortunately lighted upon evidence that the ancient text in question had been used by Origen when in Cæsarea. Moreover Dr. Blake, who was then in Oxford, showed me some selections from a text of the Georgian version older than that hitherto known, at which he was then working. We provisionally identified the non-Byzantine element in the Old Georgian with the ground text of the Θ family. Subsequently I made the further discovery that the change in the text of Mark in the fourth-century MS. W at *Mk.* v, 31 (pointed out by its editor, Prof. H. A. Sanders) was a change from a Greek text akin to the old Latin *e* to one of the type of the Θ family.

Prof. Lake, Dr. Blake and Mrs. New have since been making an extremely elaborate investigation into this text, confining themselves to the Gospel of Mark, for which the authorities are both better and more numerous than for the other Gospels. Their labours have been rewarded, not only by consolidating the position already reached, but by fresh discoveries, the more important of which I will briefly enumerate.

(1) The text of the Θ family turns out to be that used by Eusebius, as well as by Origen during the latter part of his time at Cæsarea. This settles beyond all question the connection of this text with Cæsarea.

(2) The Old Georgian turns out to be, next after Θ and 565, the most important single supporter of this text. For Mark, 565 (the Empress Theodora's Purple Codex) is slightly better than Θ—though in the other Gospels it has a predominantly Byzantine text.

(3) There is a close connection—the exact meaning of which is not yet clear—between this text and the Palestinian Syriac.

The volume includes three important Excursuses — on the 'Ecclesiastical' text by Prof. Lake; on the date of the Georgian version by Dr. Blake; on the margin of the Harclean Syrian by Mrs. New.

It ends with a continuous reconstruction of the Cæsarean text for three chapters (I, VI, and XI) of St. Mark's Gospel. B. H. STREETER.

SPIRITUAL ADVENTURES.*

Hannah Whitall Smith of Philadelphia (1832-1911), extracts from whose papers have been published recently by Mrs. Strachey, during the period in which she was associated with the Higher Life Movement, wrote and published a book called *The Christian's Secret of a Happy Life,* which had a phenomenal sale and was translated into many languages. She was by birth a member of the Society of Friends; but, refusing to be bound by any particular denominational church or creed, determined to seek the truth for herself and to follow what seemed to be the light wherever it led her. She was never tempted, one gathers, to pursue her spiritual adventures on any but Christian, or nominally Christian, paths. In these she was led to wander freely, and often found herself in very strange company. Such strange company, indeed, that Mrs. Strachey's book should have been called by another name. The title chosen is a misnomer. Fanaticism is usually taken to mean wild and excessive religious enthusiasm. This is not necessarily the same thing as abnormality in religion, or religious mania. Many quite orthodox, and not insane, Christians have been, and are, fanatics; and in favour of a certain amount of fanaticism there is much to be said. Some of the communities described, with their practices,

**Religious Fanaticism.* Being extracts from the papers of Hannah Whitall Smith, edited with an Introduction by Ray Strachey. (Faber and Gwyer, 1928. 12/6 net.)

sometimes almost licentious, by Hannah Whitall Smith were characterized not so much by fanaticism as by mental abnormality. As this kind of insanity seems to be somewhat infectious, the wonder is that the adventurer (we refrain from saying the adventuress) came through her experiences safe and sound. She never, of course, took part in any of the abominations she describes. And for the rest, as a matter of fact she was saved by being gifted with a keen sense of humour, as well as with a rare amount of common sense. Gifted as she was in these ways, her strange adventures served in the end to strengthen rather than to impair her spiritual life. She came to realize more and more the futility of a feverish search for emotionalism in religion, and to accustom herself to a state of calm and peaceful repose in a sense of union with God.

The book is in two parts. The first part contains an account by Mrs. Strachey of the curious sects and communities of America during the early and middle years of the nineteenth century. The second part contains the record of the personal experiences of Hannah Whitall Smith, who was Mrs. Strachey's grandmother. MAURICE A. CANNEY.

THE REAL MARTIN LUTHER.*

A second volume of Prof. Mackinnon's story of Luther and the Reformation traces the development of Luther's views in those critical years 1517—1521, during which the Reformation movement received its initiation. (The first volume was reviewed in the *Modern Churchman* in February, 1926, and the work is to be completed in four volumes.) This volume begins with an able discussion of the 95 Theses and the 'nefarious traffic' in indulgences which prompted them, and then provides a scholarly guide through the long drawn-out pamphlet-warfare which ensued until the Papal Bull and the Diet of Worms fixed Luther's fate. And as the scene is unrolled, stage by stage, the reader is given a good insight into the personality of the reformer. He was a man of moods, but none can question the sincerity with which he laboured and which evoked admiration from his opponents, and at least once made a notable convert from among them (*cf.* p. 48). At times Luther's humility was marked, as when, in 1518, he wrote to Staupitz, 'If God is in this enterprise, no one will prevent it. If He is quiescent, no one will set it in motion. Farewell, and pray for me and for the truth of God, whatever it may be' (p. 40). At other times he became violent in argument, and even his strongest admirers must find his fulminations when in this mood rather extravagant, as when, *e.g.*, he wrote to Leo: 'If you persist in your fury, we condemn and deliver you, along with your Bull and all your Satanic decretals, to the destruction of the flesh, that your spirit may be delivered with us in the day of the Lord' (p. 218).

But Prof. Mackinnon rightly balances the coarseness and extravagance of Luther's language against the temper and methods of his day. It is not always realised how great was the whirlpool of intrigue in which Luther found his lot cast. We see his struggle as a rivalry between two religious orders in which the Dominicans employed spies, drafted Imperial letters, and forged a Lutheran diatribe in order to discredit the Augustinian friar. We see the Pope fashioning his religious policy out of the clay of political intrigue, so that now he orders the arrest and detention of Luther 'chained hand and foot, in custody'; now he becomes almost deferential and offers Luther a cardinal's hat and a rich bishopric! It was as much

**Luther and the Reformation.* Vol. 2: *The Breach with Rome* (1517–21). By James Mackinnon, Ph.D., D.D. (Longmans. Pp. 354+xviii. Price 16/-.)

the sacredness of *veritas* which prevented a *Cardinal* Luther as it was the desire for *feritas* which had prompted the offer.

Admittedly, the most important of Luther's works were the triad which he published in 1520—*The Address to the Nobility, The Babylonish Captivity of the Church,* and *The Liberty of a Christian Man.* And on the whole, we agree with the high estimate which Prof. Mackinnon places on these. Of the second, he says that 'It marks a truly marvellous emancipation from mediaevalism in religion' and contains 'one of the finest pleas for the liberty of the individual Christian.' But only with some qualification can the words *liberty, emancipation,* and *toleration* be used of these works or of Luther's general attitude. The freedom which he desired was a negative freedom : a man should not be forced to do what the Scriptures, according to his interpretation, convinced him was wrong, though he might be compelled to do what the Bible said was right. But this was further limited. For the toleration which Luther preached resolved itself into a liberty to disagree with the Roman Church—as long as there was agreement with Luther ! At times he meant better than he said, and he certainly achieved more than he imagined. But in regard to toleration he was a child of his age, though he did produce the requisite spark. And 'how much wood is kindled by how small a fire !' J.P.H.

SHORT NOTICES.

The title of Canon Raven's book, *The Quest of Religion* (S.C.M., price 4/- and 2/6), is a reminder that religion must always involve a quest, since its creeds and dogmas remain cold and dead unless the truths to which they witness are made a matter of personal experience. And it is with this that Canon Raven is concerned—the experience and experiences which life offers, the values which these involve and their adequate expression in intellectual form. This, we feel, is the most useful approach to the creeds; and though this book is slight, we recommend it to all who feel that there is something unreal about Christian doctrines. The chapters on the Atonement are especially lucid. Canon Raven's style is never abstruse, and his appeal is the stronger because it bears the stamp of burning conviction.

Why Mr. Bertrand Russell is not a Christian (H. G. Wood, M.A.; S.C.M.; price 4/- and 2/6) is a brilliant essay in controversy which provides stimulating and enjoyable reading from cover to cover. The writer has not said the last word on all the arguments he refutes, but he cleverly turns the tables on his opponent. The object of his examination is the attitude of Mr. Bertrand Russell as expressed *chiefly* in *Why I am not a Christian,* and as a piece of constructive criticism Mr. Wood's effort leaves little to be desired.

Huxley once remarked in regard to one section of the Bible that an intelligent understanding of it was made impossible by reason of the fact that at every turn one came across the sign-post, 'No Thoroughfare—Moses !' We do not suggest that this gave the Bishop of Pretoria his title, but at any rate his book—*A Biblical Thoroughfare* (S.C.M.; price 7/6; pp. 350)—attacks Huxley's difficulty, and will help the ordinary reader to gain something of that historical appreciation of the Bible which modern scholarship has done so much to achieve. Some such 'thoroughfare' is a necessity in these days when critical analysis has made what Dr. Talbot calls 'a labyrinth of what was to our forbears a plain track' (p. 180). Accordingly, he sets out to place the various books of the Bible in their historical setting and to bring into focus such critical light as will conduce to a better understanding of their essential message. He is conservative in

his attitude towards problems of authorship and date; but perhaps this is explained by the fact that the book is intended, not for the scholar, but for the general public. We should like to query many points—*e.g.* concerning the nature of the return from Exile, or the purpose and setting of the *Epistle to the Hebrews*—and we confess that we remain unconvinced by the Bishop's arguments for the authenticity of the Fourth Gospel. But the book is well written, and it should prove useful to those who want not only to read but to appreciate their Bibles.

Moral Adventure (S.C.M.; price 2/6) is a reprint of the essay under that name by Canon Streeter in the book *Adventure*. It is an able and lucid examination of the taboos and conventions of morality, with a plea 'not for a new set of rules, but a new point of view.' There are many who will be glad to have this essay in the form of a separate booklet.

J.P.H.

CORRESPONDENCE

'RELIGION IN PUBLIC SCHOOLS.'

SIR, To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

May I be allowed to offer a brief criticism of Mr. Neville Gorton's article, 'Religion in Public Schools,' in your February issue?

In spite of his declaration, at the beginning of his paper, that he intended to avoid them, Mr. Gorton went on to make a number of generalizations of which two at least seem to me to be misleading.

1. 'In any given Public School the Headmaster and practically all the staff are "Modern Churchmen" in the broadest sense of the phrase.' If there is any value in a generalization on this point, I should feel that the truth of the case is something like this. In those schools which are not definitely Catholic in tradition—and many are—the Headmaster is probably (more or less cautiously) a 'Modern Churchman.' Assistant masters in Orders are the more likely to be 'Modern Churchmen' in inverse ratio to their age. With lay assistant masters the same is likely to be true, except that perhaps a quarter of them may be indifferent or hostile to Christianity.

2. 'You will find that the average form-master gives more time and care to the preparation of New Testament work than to anything else. Most of them'—and the boys as well—'would say that it was the most interesting hour in the week.' If this is really the case at the school from which Mr. Gorton writes, I can only congratulate him—and its Headmaster—on having brought about a state of affairs which is the ideal of every Public School Headmaster or Chaplain who really cares about the Divinity teaching, but which is, I am perfectly certain, highly exceptional as yet. When the teaching is still done by the form-master as such—a bad system based on the mistaken idea that boys are likely to become more religious if taught Divinity, just because he is their form-master, by a man who does not know very much about the subject, rather than by an expert—I believe the efforts of the teacher to be often unwilling and spasmodic, and the boredom of the boys not at all infrequent.

This criticism is, I know, merely negative; but complacent optimism is not an aid to real progress. Before we shall get Divinity really well taught in all our Public Schools, we must persuade Governing Bodies and parents that present conditions still leave much to be desired.

Yours, etc., H. KENNETH LUCE.

3 Little Dean's Yard, Westminster, S.W.
February 27th, 1929.

THE MODERN CHURCHMAN AND THE FREE CHURCHMAN.

To the Editor of the *Modern Churchman.*

SIR,

The Rev. C. H. Valentine has explained that the faith now held by Modern Churchmen and many progressive Free Churchmen is essentially the same; and he also gives some practical reasons which prevent Free Churchmen from leaving their own Churches and seeking to take Orders in the Church of England. May I as a Free Church minister state the more general obstacles which stand in the way?

Many ministers will agree with Mr. Valentine when he speaks of the attractions of the Church of England — the richness of its worship, 'the order and tradition of the Church, the beauty of its buildings, the greater opportunity it affords for influence and service,' etc. How well the value of these things is appreciated! But unfortunately they can only be enjoyed after the sacrifice of mental and spiritual freedom.

A Free Church minister is extraordinarily free. He is not bound to recite a fixed form of service, where some expressions have grown antiquated and have become hard to understand, where ancient dogmas once believed in but now rejected are expressed, and where some most un-Christian sentiments are publicly uttered. He is under no necessity to sing the psalms of cursing, if they are among the psalms of the day; he is entirely free to select his own readings from the Scripture, so that he can avoid all those lessons from the Old Testament which offend the Christian consciousness.

And he is quite unbound by creeds. I know of no Free Church service at which a creed is recited. Mr. Valentine believes, however, that a minister is constrained by the Trust Deed of the particular chapel which he serves. But in this, I think, he is certainly mistaken. Many chapels possess Trust Deeds in which the faith of the congregation is purposely described in the widest and most general terms. Those Trust Deeds which are more particular and minute are being remodelled, as opportunity permits, according to Modernist ideas. But Trust Deeds are things that lie in sealed boxes and are rarely disturbed. They are certainly never repeated at divine worship. And ministers and congregations consider themselves free to disregard their dogmatic statements, if they desire to do so. A minister told me that a legal decision had been given that the dogmatic portions of a chapel's Trust Deed had no power to bind the religious faith of the congregation which had legally and historically inherited it.

Members of Unitarian and Free Christian Churches have long boasted that the unity of their religious society does not depend upon a written creed; and they have strenuously refused to adopt one. But now the members of many other Free Churches say the same thing. At a recent meeting of Free Church ministers all present declared that they had to submit to no formularies of belief.

Readers of the *Modern Churchman* will understand the advantages of such mental and spiritual freedom. Can it surprise them that Free Church ministers, who enjoy such liberty in their own churches, should rarely convert to the Church of England, where creeds and statements of belief are so many and so obtrusive? Every religious-minded Englishman feels the attractions of the National Church; but what a ruinous price must every minister pay who would desert his own Free Church in order to enjoy them!

Yours, J. K. NETTLEFOLD.

Octagon Chapel, Norwich.